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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This article identifies and explains four conceptions of cruelty in criminal law and 
reconstructs the models of practical reason they inhabit. It advances conceptual, 
historical, and normative arguments. Conceptually, it articulates distinct notions of 
cruelty according to the types of agency, victimhood, values, and causality they employ. 
Historically, it argues that these conceptions belong with three models of practical reason 
which the article reconstructs in their evolution. Normatively, it argues that the rejection 
of cruelty is one of the fundamental achievements of practical reason in criminal law. 
More generally, the article indicates how the operation of reflectivity in the context of 
ideas about cruelty serves as a model of legal reasoning to be emulated.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Four distinct conceptions of cruelty are found in criminal law. This article has 
three objectives. First, it aims to explain those conceptions of cruelty according to the 
types of agency, victimhood, values, and causality involved. However, conceptions of 
cruelty do not emerge in an argumentative vacuum. Therefore, the second objective is to 
reconstruct the models of practical reason within which they first arose.1 Each model of 
practical reason informs, in turn, conceptions of mercy2 and of the requirements of a just 
system of criminal law. Finally, the article indicates how the push of reflectivity operating 
within each model of practical reason shapes the normative horizon of criminal law, 
offering a mode of legal reasoning to be emulated. 
 
The four conceptions of cruelty are the following: agent-objective, agent-
subjective, victim-subjective, and victim-objective/agent-independent. Each corresponds 
to one of three models of practical reasoning in of the rejection of cruelty, namely cruelty 
as agency, cruelty as suffering, or cruelty as predicament. The emergence of each 
conception of cruelty owes much to the push of reflectivity triggered by the limitations of 
previous conceptions and their respective models of practical reason.3 Although in their 
philosophical origins the four conceptions of cruelty emerged in chronological 
succession, they are now subsumed and integrated under the appeal and cogency of the 
                                               
1 My thinking on practical reason has been informed, among others, by the following: Aristotle, 
Nichomacean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); David Hume, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Niditch (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Immanuel Kant, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); C. Korsgaard, Creating the 
Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); J. Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action, 2 Volumes (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984);  M. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1987); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1979); A. Gibbard, Thinking How to Live (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003); J. 
Hampton, The Authority of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Robert Nozick, The 
Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Onora O‘Neill, Constructions of 
Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J. Raz, Engaging Reason (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1999); Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1998); J. D. Velleman, J. D., Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); J. Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); and A. MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice? Which Rationality? (University of Notre Dame Press, 1989). 
2 See on the topic of mercy Claudia Card, ―On mercy‖,  he Philosophical Review, 81(2), 182–207 (1972); 
Ross Harrison, ―The Equality of Mercy,‖ in Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays, ed. Hyman Gross and Ross 
Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Nussbaum, Martha C. (1993). Equity and mercy. 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22(2); and Austin Sarat and Nasser Hussain, Forgiveness, Mercy and 
Clemency (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).  
3 See Thomas Kun, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1996) and Alasdair MacIntyre, ―The Relationship of Philosophy to Its Past,‖ in Richard Rorty, Jerome 
Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
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last model of practical reason in the rejection of cruelty. I argue that this model is 
superior to its predecessors.  
 
 
A. Cruelty and Criminal Law 
 
  
 Consider the following overt or implied conceptions of cruelty:  
 
 1.  
―It is … within the historic process of constitutional adjudication to 
challenge the imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric 
manner or as a penalty wholly disproportionate to a particular 
criminal act. And in making such a judgment … a court may 
consider contemporary standards to the extent they are 
relevant.‖4   
 
―Feelings of ‗fear, anguish and inferiority‘ are the common lot of 
mankind constantly experienced by everyone in the course of 
ordinary everyday life: that is „la condition humaine‟. Yet no one 
would consider himself, or regard others, as humiliated and 
debased because of experiencing such feelings, even though some 
experience them very easily and others only for greater cause. 
Thus it is not the subjective feelings aroused in the individual 
that humiliate or debase but the objective character of the act 
or treatment that gives rise to those feelings – if it does – and 
even if it does not, – for it is possible for fanatics at one end of the 
scale, and saints, martyrs and heroes at the other to undergo the 
most degrading treatment and feel neither humiliated nor debased, 
but even uplifted. Yet the treatment itself remains none the less 
degrading.‖5 
 
 2. 
―The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt 
consummation of the sentence cannot … add an element of cruelty 
to a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to inflict 
unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the 
proposed execution.‖6  
 
                                               
4 Furman v. Georgia, 420, emphasis added. 
5 Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 January 1978, 2 E.H.R.R 25. Separate opinion by Judge 
Fitzmaurice, emphasis added 
6 Francis v. Resweber, 464, emphasis added. 
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―This Court‘s cases ‗mandate inquiry into a prison official‘s state 
of mind,‘ […] and it is no accident that the Court has repeatedly 
said that the Eighth Amendment has a ‗subjective component.‘‖7  
 
―The five [sensory deprivation] techniques were applied in 
combination with premeditation …‖8 
 
 3. 
 
―Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment. The infliction of 
an extremely severe punishment will often entail physical 
suffering. Yet the Framers also knew that there could be exercises 
of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or 
mutilation. Even though there may be involved no physical 
mistreatment, no primitive torture, severe mental pain may be 
inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment.‖9  
 
   ―Death is […] an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its  
   pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.‖10  
 
―[I]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to 
fall within the scope of Article 3 [of the European Convention on 
Human Rights]. The assessment of this minimum is, in the 
nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of 
the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or 
mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim, etc.‖11  
 
 4. 
―The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing 
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to 
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be 
exercised within the limits of civilized standards.‖12  
 
―The barbaric punishments condemned by history, … are, of 
course, attended with acute pain and suffering. When we consider 
why they have been condemned, however, we realize that the 
pain involved is not the only reason. The true significance of 
these punishments is that  they treat members of the human 
                                               
7 Farmer v Brennan, 826, emphasis added. 
8 Ireland v. United Kingdom, [page?],  emphasis added. 
9 Furman v. Georgia, 271, internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis added.   
10 Gregg v. Georgia, 428, emphasis added. 
11 Ireland v. United Kingdom, [page?], emphasis added. 
12 Trop v. Dulles, 100, emphasis added. 
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race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. 
They are thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the 
Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being 
possessed of common human dignity.‖13  
  
―The words ‗cruel and unusual‘ certainly include penalties that are 
barbaric. But the words …suggest that it is ‗cruel and unusual‘ to 
apply the death penalty – or any other penalty – selectively to 
minorities whose numbers are  few, who are outcasts of 
society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to 
see suffer though it would not countenance general application 
of the same penalty across the board.‖14  
 
―[T]he burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the 
ignorant, and the underprivileged members of society. […] 
Their impotence leaves them victims of a sanction that the 
wealthier, better-represented, just-as-guilty person can escape. So 
long as the capital sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily 
forgotten members of society, legislators are content to maintain 
the status quo, because change would draw attention to the 
problem and concern might develop. Ignorance is perpetuated 
and apathy soon becomes its mate, and we have today’s 
situation.‖15  
 
―The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado 
interrogation … is inherently intimidating … This atmosphere 
carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not 
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human 
dignity.‖16  
―[T]he Court is of the opinion that the prison conditions 
complained of diminished the applicant’s human dignity and 
aroused in him feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical 
or moral resistance.‖17 
 
―The Court would further emphasize that the essence of such 
violation does not so much lie in the fact of the ‘disappearance’ 
of the family member but rather concerns the authorities’ 
reactions and attitudes to the situation when it is brought to 
their attention.‖18 
                                               
13 Furman v. Georgia, 272-273, internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis added. 
14 Furman v. Georgia, 244-245, emphasis added. 
15 Furman v. Georgia, 365-366, emphasis added. 
16 Miranda v. Arizona, emphasis added. 
17 Peers v. Greece, Judgment of 19 April 2001, 33 E.H.R.R. 51. 
18 Cakici v. Turkey, Judgment of 7 July 1999, 31 E.H.R.R. 5. 
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 These conceptions of cruelty from American and European criminal law are 
representative of cruelty in many criminal jurisdictions.19 Even more broadly, they reflect 
an outlook that pervades several fields of national and international law.20 The legal 
importance of the rejection of cruelty is obvious. Even in its ancient origins, the idea of 
cruelty was a matter of law. Bestiality, a form of brutality without a legal purpose, 
belonged with nature – physis – and not with law – nomos. 21 
 
Concepts of cruelty are distinguishable along two axes. In the first, the 
definitional element of cruelty runs from focus on agency to focus on victimization in the 
perpetrator-victim relationship. The second axis tracks emphasis on objectivist or 
subjectivist definitional elements. Objective conceptions emphasize the objective 
predicament of the victim or the behavior of agents of cruelty in relation to objective 
norms of behavior.  Subjective conceptions require on the part of victims a minimum 
level of feeling or awareness, whereas on the part of agents of cruelty they require some 
type of mens rea or hedonistic gratification vis-à-vis the subjective suffering or objective 
condition of victims. The plane engendered by these two axes captures all four 
conceptions of cruelty revealed in criminal law adjudication and theory.  
 
In contemporary criminal law, the four conceptions of cruelty have proved not to 
be mutually exclusive in practice. Rather, they relate to one another through a semantic 
and normative process of foregrounding and backgrounding the various definitional 
elements. The depth and breadth of the definitional regimes that emerge from this process 
                                               
19 In some cases the prohibition appears under more inclusive language, thus setting higher the bar of 
protection. See, for example, the German Basic Law of 1949, Article 104 [Legal guarantees in the event of 
detention],“[…] Detainees may not be subjected to mental or physical ill-treatment.”  The Brazilian 
Constitution of 1988, after proclaiming that no punishment shall be ―cruel‖ (Article 5, XLVII, e) further 
asserts that to all prisoners it is guaranteed the respect to their physical and moral integrity (Article 5, 
XLIX).    
20The four conceptions of cruelty exemplified in the quotes above mirror ubiquitous conceptions of 
suffering, victimization, agency, and causality. To give just one example, in the areas of human rights, 
disabilities, family interactions, health care, and animal protection, the law attempts to capture the 
unjustifiable suffering of victims of neglect, discrimination, abuse, and brutality. The more general point to 
be made is that the commitment to human dignity, general solidarity, individual empowerment, and 
positive and negative structural justice found in the fourth, integrative conception of cruelty contributes to 
the normative foundation of the extensive juridical corpus regulating central aspects of welfare, equality, 
liberty, and solidarity. In its many connections, this legal corpus confronts structural problems of justice in 
modern societies and advances the fundamental individual and collective rights embodying aspirations for 
decent societies. 
21 See Paulo Barrozo, op. cit. Of course the cultural presence of a concern with cruelty extrapolates the 
territory of legal and moral normativity. My soap bar label reads, ―Chamomile: cruelty-free, biodegradable, 
natural, no artificial colors.‖  It is clear that the intensity of reflectivity in the rejection grows in inverted 
ratio to its spread. Indeed, there is a point where the concern is purely mimetic, lacking the sort of reflective 
mediation which accompanies normative development of the kind studied in this essay. That my soap bar 
label has anything to say about cruelty confirms the plausibility of theories of mimetic evolution (see 
Richard Dawkins‘s The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), and Jack M. Balkin‘s 
Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), while the push of 
reflectivity discussed below prove clearly the existence of a normative territory guarded by reflectivity and 
in which mimetic contamination is not the name of the game, at least not anymore or not yet. 
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correspond to the different models of practical reasoning in the rejection of cruelty in 
criminal law.  
     
As if adding a third dimension to the plane designed by the two definitional axes 
just mentioned, consider further the way in which each conception of cruelty implicitly 
directs the influence of time and causation as legal considerations. While, as detailed 
below, the first three conceptions of cruelty direct the legal focus to units of action and 
feeling concentrated in time, the fourth conception invites attention and gives legal 
weight to protracted causality and long-term effects. This last, more continuous, role of 
temporal considerations in law is clearly manifest, for example, in the search for 
solutions to problems of social vulnerability and unequal protection by the law. 
 
 Focus on the evolutionary arc of the concern with cruelty in criminal law 
facilitates the sort of cultural introspection that I hope will remind us of the promises of 
justice and mercy that criminal law must help uphold. Moreover, using criminal law to 
provide a telescopic view into the nature of societies sheds light on the human 
condition.22 As one embarks in this sort of journey, he must remain constantly alert to 
what is at stake for both individuals and societies in the rejection of cruelty. Whatever is 
found at the end of this journey, and no matter how strenuous it may be, I suspect anyone 
would be ill-advised to ever return from it.    
  
 
B. Cruelty, Practical Reason, and Reflectivity  
 
 
 As an ideal, the rejection of cruelty has shaped the criminal law of liberal 
democracies. Certainly, this influence has been exerted with faltering clarity, consistency, 
and efficacy. In legal practice, the rejection of cruelty has predominantly taken the form 
of doctrines that patrol the outer limits of punishment as set by constitutional prohibitions 
against cruel punishment. Outside the confines of legal practice, an influential tradition of 
liberal political and legal theory, rightly terrified by the ubiquity of brutality and the ever 
renewed threats of unjustifiable suffering, prescribes the cultivation of a pre-reflective 
sensibility that shuns cruelty.23 The flaw in these doctrinal and philosophical approaches 
is basically twofold.24 First, it underestimates the deep link between the reflective 
                                               
22 For an interesting thesis about the heuristic value of criminal law in social theory see Emile Durkheim, 
The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1997). 
23 Judith Shklar offers a good example of this in her influential essay on the question of cruelty. In the 
Conclusion I briefly engage with the limitations and possibilities of the kind of normative vision on social 
life that Shklar advances. In its place, I propose the rudiments of an ideal more fully reflective in the 
rejection of cruelty. See Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1984), Chapter 1, and 
Richard Rorty‘s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge:: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
which was written under the inspiration of the way Shklar connected a victim-subjective conception of 
cruelty with a particular tradition of liberal thought. John Kekes, in his ―Cruelty and Liberalism,‖ Ethics 
106, no. 4 (1996): 834-844, resists, in the name of conservative politics, the liberal claim to monopoly of 
the concern with cruelty.   
24 I have detailed the nature and presented a critique of this kind of doctrinal effort in Paulo Barrozo, “The 
Foundations of Constitutional Punishment” (forthcoming).  
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soundness of a normative ideal and macro changes in moral sensibility. Second, it asks 
for too little. To avoid these flaws, this article rededicates the concern with cruelty to a 
deeper and more coherent image of justice in criminal law which, on the basis of 
stringent reflectivity, hopes to chart a path away from merely reactive legal doctrines and 
the type of liberalism that underestimates or even mistrusts the potential of practical 
reason in law.  
 
Here, there is no need to inflate the notion of reflectivity or to appeal to arcane 
conceptions of it. By reflectivity I mean simply, but of course not merely, ennoia, in the 
ancient sense of intense, careful, and self-conscious thinking. In this sense, reflectivity 
informs models of practical reason which are mindful of and yet not reduced to 
instrumental, context-bound, and self-interested reasoning, for reflectivity implicates the 
faculty of judgment, attention to context accompanied by the capacity to transcend it in 
principled ways, and the constant critical folding upon itself, in ways that the operation of 
flat – purely empirical or merely consequentialist – rationality does not entail.25 There 
are, despite slow progress and recurrent episodes of regress, good reasons to stay hopeful 
about the fate of a project to rethink cruelty as an enterprise of reason in criminal law.  
 
At any rate, this deflated conception of reflectivity requires only acceptance of 
two uncontroversial claims. First, that normative worldviews are built upon the basis of, 
and expressed as, clusters of converging, when not cohering, normative arguments. That 
is, they are built upon models of practical reason. Second, that these models carry logical 
and deontological entailment as well as practical requirements, cognitive access to which 
is given by thinking thoroughly, clearly, and critically about them (that is, by 
reflectivity). To the extent that the push of reflectivity may prevail, it holds the promise 
of a criminal law that does not continue to compromise with cruelty as a quotidian event.  
 
 The emergence of the four conceptions of cruelty and the models of practical 
reason they inhabit follow, I have noted, a chronological sequence, as did their impact 
upon criminal law. This is no coincidence. Rather, it evinces the modus operandi of the 
push of reflectivity, and the way reflectivity acts on legal change. No doubt, the push of 
reflectivity works inside clusters of normative arguments in any number of ways, but to 
give evidence that it does work, we need only look at exemplary cases, such as the case 
of the evolution of ideas about cruelty in criminal law. At the end, the changes in 
practical reasoning analyzed in this article recommend interpretations of modernity that 
give prominence to the content-creation capabilities of reflective forces over the 
operation of content-blind rationalizing, or managerial and merely participatory 
mechanisms. The understanding of reflective evolution in criminal law ultimately 
                                               
25 Nietzsche – The Pre-Platonic Philosophers (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 
5-6 – speaks of ―an excess of intellect that [a people or an individual] no longer directs [...] only for 
personal, individual purposes but rather arrives at a pure intuition with it.‖ Although an extensive treatment 
of the question of reflectivity cannot be accommodated in this essay, I am convinced that some form of 
intellectual exuberance of this sort is inextricably involved in reflectivity as a weighty causal factor in 
social processes. For a defense of the idea of a ―Socratic citizenship‖ as a form of reflective agency, see 
Dana R. Villa‘s Socratic Citizenship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
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provides the most elegant, historically informative, and critically consequent standpoint 
from which to understand the ways, good and bad, of criminal justice.  
 
I have also noted that conceptions of cruelty do not emerge in an argumentative 
vacuum. They gain meaning and traction in the history of criminal law when embedded 
in models of practical reason. In order to reveal and reconstruct the models of practical 
reason which envelop the four conceptions of cruelty, I turn to their seminal formulation 
in the history of legal and moral thought.26 Thus, in mobilizing seminal insights on the 
problem of cruelty by Seneca, Thomas Aquinas, Michel de Montaigne, Immanuel Kant, 
Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill, I seek to show the types of arguments involved in 
forging the normative vistas corresponding to the distinct conceptions of cruelty.27  
 
 
II. FIRST MODEL OF PRACTICAL REASON: CRUELTY AS 
 AGENCY  
 
 
                                               
26  As the philosopher Charles Taylor once wrote, ―to understand ourselves today, we are pushed into the 
past for paradigm statements of our formative articulations. We are forced back to the last full  disclosure 
of what  we  have  been  about,  or  what  our  practice   has  been  woven about.‖ ―Philosophy and Its 
History‖ in Philosophy in History, ed.  Richard Rorty, et al. (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 26. I presuppose throughout the centrality of meaning in human experience. Max Weber more than 
any other has brought this centrality to the attention of the modern social scientist. I think Diderot captured 
it well when he wrote in the Encyclopédie that ―If mankind, or the thinking and contemplative beings 
which comprise it, were banished from the surface of the earth, the moving and sublime spectacle of nature 
would be nothing more than a scene of desolation and silence. The universe would be mute; stillness and 
night would take possession of it. Everything would be transformed into a vast emptiness where 
unremarked phenomena would occur, dimly and unheard.‖ Denis Diderot‘s Political Writings (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 25.                                                              
27 The sources used here are Seneca‘s De Clementia, written by AD. 55 or 56 and addressed to his pupil, 
the then young emperor Nero; Aquinas‘ Summa Theologiae, published from 1265-1272, in particular 
Questions 2a2ae 157 and 159, dedicated to De Clementia et Mansuetudine and De Crudelitate, 
respectively, as part of his writings on the virtue of temperance; Montaigne‘s essay “On Cruelty,” 
appearing in Book II of his Essais, which had various modified editions until his death in 1592; Kant‘s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785; Marx‘s “On the Jewish Question” of 1843, “For a 
Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing” of 1844, “Preface to „A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy‟” of 1859, and the first volume of Capital, written in 1866 and 1867 and published in 1867; and, 
finally, Mill‘s The Subjection of Women, written in 1861 but not published until 1869. See Lucius Seneca, 
Moral Essays, Vol. 1, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Thomas 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, trans. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1972); Michel de Montaigne, 
The Complete Essays, trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1991); Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals in Practical Philosophy, op. cit.; Karl Marx, ―On the Jewish Question‖ in Marx: Early Political 
Writings, trans. Joseph O‘Malley and Richard A. Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
―For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing‖ in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker   
(New York: Norton, 1978), ―Preface to ‗A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy‘‖ used in 
conjunction with his The German Ideology: Part I in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker   
(New York: Norton, 1978), The German Ideology was written in 1845-1846 but only published in 1932, 
and Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); 
and John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John 
Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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C. CONCEPTION 1: AGENT-OBJECTIVE 
 
 
 In criminal law, agent-objective cruelty is characterized by punitive agency which 
goes further than the strict punishment demanded by the applicable norms. We owe to 
Seneca, author of the earliest surviving sustained discussion of cruelty, the seminal 
explanation of the agent-objective concept of cruelty.28 Because his concept presupposes 
a suffering victim, cruelty is defined by the anomic behavior of the agent who causes that 
suffering. However, it is Seneca‘s emphasis on agency and objective norms of behavior 
that renders his conception agent-objective.   
 
 A stoic philosopher, Seneca defines cruelty in the context of a model of practical 
reason characterized by natural law and virtue ethics. Specifically, cruelty is a point on a 
continuum of vices and virtues, with the vices on each end: pity  mercy  strictness 
 cruelty. In this continuum, pity is a vicious degeneration of the virtue of mercy in 
punishment, and cruelty is a vicious degeneration of the virtue of strictness. While 
excessive mercy turns into pity, excessive strictness trespasses into cruelty. Cruelty thus 
obtains when excessive suffering is caused by agents whose behavior deviates from 
statutory, customary, religious or moral norms of strictness. It is important to note that in 
Seneca‘s scheme, pity is opposed to strictness and cruelty to mercy. An excessively soft 
punitive system29 can be cleansed by strictness, and a cruel one by mercy. 
 
 Seneca thus writes:  
 
‗‗But,‘ you say, ‗there are some who do not exact punishment and yet are 
cruel,  such as those who kill the strangers they meet, not for the sake of 
gain, but for the sake of killing, and, not content with killing, they torture. 
[…] This indeed is cruelty; but because it does not result from vengeance 
– for no injury was suffered – and no sin stirs its wrath – for no crime 
preceded it – it falls outside of our definition; for by the definition the 
mental excess was limited to the exaction of  punishment. That which finds 
pleasure in torture we may say is not cruelty, but savagery—we may even 
call it madness; for  there are various kinds of madness, and none is 
more unmistakable than that which reaches the point of murdering and 
mutilating men. Those, then, that I shall call cruel are those who have a 
reason for punishment, but do not have moderation in it, like Phalaris, 
who, they say, tortured men, even though they were not innocent, in a 
manner that was inhuman and incredible. Avoiding sophistry we may 
define cruelty to be the inclination of the mind toward the side of 
                                               
28 Seneca, De Clementia, op. cit. 
29 On ancient punishment see David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, 
Aeschylus, and Plato, Tennessee Law Review, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 279-325 (1987) and Adriaan Lanni, 
Verdict Most Just: The Modes of Classical Athenian Justice 16 Yale J.L. & Human. 277 (2004).  
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harshness. This quality mercy repels and bids it stand ajar from her; with 
strictness she is in harmony.‖30 
 
  
 This passage orients the scheme of vices and virtues in the context of punishment, 
a legal institution by definition. It offers a conception of cruelty as excess in punishment, 
where excess is determined in light of natural criminal law. In his effort to persuade his 
pupil Nero to abandon the ways of cruelty, Seneca reminded him that the only virtue that 
could truly rival great power was that of self-control. This self-control of sovereign 
punitive power takes the form of mercy. Commanded by natural criminal law, punitive 
mercy is also favored for consequentialist reasons – ―Mercy […] makes rulers not only 
more honored, but safer, and is at the same time the glory of sovereign power and its 
surest protection.‖31 Mercy is, furthermore, an unconditional virtue. No matter how 
atrocious the deed to be punished, its agent is to be treated mercifully by the punitive 
powers. Nothing can excuse the sovereign from this duty. The unconditionality of mercy 
helps explain why the character and behavior of the victim cannot excuse any 
withholding of mercy in the agent-objective conception of cruelty. However, mercy is not 
supposed to be unlimited, lest it degenerates into pity. Punishment, which has an 
important social function to meet, cannot succeed if it fails to express the distinction 
between vice and virtue. Mercy, therefore, must not operate to blur the distinction 
between good and bad.32 Its role is that of tempering punishment, the type and severity of 
which must be sufficient to demarcate virtue from vice without indulging in the infliction 
of all punishment power is capable of. In short, the gap between sufficient and possible 
punishment is not to be bridged, for when it is cruelty is what does it.   
 
Seneca placed cruelty in a model of practical reason made possible by an absolute 
and immutable natural law system. This system was able to guide action toward virtue 
because it offered, Seneca believed, objective norms to access behavior independently of 
mentalist considerations. In contemporary criminal law, the normative benchmark of 
cruelty is no longer found in natural law, but rather in punitive tradition, communal 
standards, fables of original legislative meaning, or on specific laws or individualized 
sentences.33 But even on the narrow grounds of the objective social or legal norms 
available to us, it would be very hard to argue that existing criminal justice systems are 
not cruel.34  Even in what is usually seen as mainstream and legitimate punishment, the 
gap between minimally necessary punishment and all the punishment power has the 
resources to inflict is constantly bridged. By definition, this gap-filling is a manifestation 
of state violence which meets the definitional requirements of the agent-objective 
conception of cruelty.   
 
                                               
30 Seneca, op. cit., 435–437.  
31 Ibid., 391. 
32 See Seneca, 363-395. 
33 For a detailed discussion of the objective norms that now operate as functional equivalents of natural law, 
see Paulo Barrozo, “The Foundations of Constitutional Punishment,” op. cit.   
34 Paulo Barrozo, “Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, Cruelty and Mercy”, op.cit. 
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 Seneca‘s conception of cruelty was made intelligible in its complex of 
assumptions and implications as part of a model of practical reason anchored in natural 
law and informed by a stoic outlook. Though his model of practical reason has since lost 
its appeal and authority, the resulting condemnation of cruelty has an enduring and 
pervasive influence in criminal law.  
 
 Furthermore, Seneca will always be right in his observation that ―cruelty‘s 
greatest curse— [is] that one must persist in it, and no return to better things is open; for 
crime must be safeguarded by crime. But what creature is more unhappy than the man 
who now cannot help being wicked?‖35 Culturally speaking, when the time came to leave 
the learned, agonistic pages of De Clementia, criminal law theory benefitted, for the first 
time, from seeing cruelty explained, in one of its fundamental forms. Ever since, criminal 
law has lived under a normative horizon with enhanced moral and intellectual resources 
to reject it.     
 
 
D. CONCEPTION 2: AGENT-SUBJECTIVE 
 
    
Thomas Aquinas orchestrated a subjectivist turn in the conception of cruelty 
inherited from Seneca, while at the same time sharing with Seneca the main contours of a 
model of practical reason centered on natural law as a framework for an ethics of virtue. 
In Aquinas‘ formulation, and consistent with Seneca‘s definition, the concept of cruelty 
still presupposes a suffering victim, takes the agent end of the perpetrator-victim axis, 
and necessitates that the agent‘s suffering-causing commission or omission be in 
violation of an objectively ascertainable normative standard of behavior. However, 
Aquinas adds a subjective element: cruelty obtains only when the agent‘s deviant 
behavior is accompanied by a personal delight in causing and witnessing suffering.  
 
  For Aquinas, cruelty is at the end of the continuum softness  mercy  
clemency  cruelty. The righteous middle of the continuum is to be found in the virtues 
of mercy and clemency. In this continuum, softness is the vice of laxity in punishment, 
and cruelty the vice, on the part of the agent of excessive punishment, of delight 
regarding the torments he inflicts on his victims. Mercy in this scheme is a rational 
decision to relieve suffering caused by punishment, and clemency is the disposition of 
temper prompting to mercy. In the context of punishment, cruelty obtains when suffering 
is caused by punitive agency that delights in the hardships that punishment brings upon 
those subject to it. It is worth noticing that whereas for Aquinas the subjective element of 
cruelty was hedonistic in nature, in contemporary criminal law this element is usually met 
by more traditional mens rea standards.  
 
 Aquinas‘ subjectivist turn is best understood in the context of his natural law 
theory. More complex and developed than Seneca‘s, Aquinas‘ natural law theory speaks 
of a divinely ordered universe, the balance and symmetry of which is to maintained first 
                                               
35 Seneca, op. cit., 397. 
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and foremost in the inner spaces of reason and passions.36 Both Seneca and Aquinas 
conceive of a cosmic order permanently vulnerable to violation, in action or intention, by 
free-willing agents. In this worldview, punishment is a means to restore, via retribution 
and the expressionist function of punishment, a violated cosmic order, bringing it back to 
its ex ante perfection. To punish is to nullify37 the aggression free-willing agents inflicted 
in the natural order of the universe. Hence, and importantly, both Seneca and Aquinas 
insist that punishment does not violate, objectively or subjectively, the order it seeks to 
repair.   
 
 The idea of a cosmic order in Aquinas‘ jurisprudence is created and guaranteed by 
an interlocking normative system. His philosophy of law distinguishes four types of law: 
eternal, natural, human, and divine. These four different kinds of law are distinguished by 
their lawgivers, their jurisdiction or scope, and the strength of their binding authority.   
 
Aquinas defines eternal law as the government, by God‘s reason, of everything 
existing in the universe.38 In the jurisdiction of eternal law, Aquinas places the whole 
realm of physis, which comprises, for instance, the laws of nature in biology, chemistry, 
and physics; that is, laws which govern ―the whole community of the universe…by 
Divine Reason.‖39 Eternal law has, moreover, absolute binding power. The absoluteness 
of its power is faultlessly evinced in blind observance of its decrees by nature; a nature 
which, in its passiveness and unconsciousness, displays the prescriptions of God‘s reason. 
Eternal law is, therefore, the normative dimension of the great order of things. 
 
   Natural law applies solely to humankind. It is in a sense a section of eternal law, 
with specialized jurisdiction upon beings that partake, up to a limited but fundamental 
extent, in God‘s rational attributes: ―the rational creature is subject to divine providence 
in the most excellent way […]. [w]herefore it has a share of the eternal reason.‖40 
Analogous to and derived from God‘s, human reasoning is able, asserts Aquinas, to guide 
choices and deeds toward the common good, ―and this participation of the eternal law in 
the rational creature is called the natural law.‖41 It is, thus, the ―imprint‖ on people of a 
―divine light‖ that entrusts them, as the rational segment of God‘s creation, the co-
responsibility for the government of the cosmos according to the good. In their 
possession and use of this natural reason, individuals join God as active participants in 
the government of the universe, specifically in the government of society. 
 
In the natural association of individuals into society, humanity indeed lives as a 
ruled species; ruled, however, in self-government, for humanity is co-author, with God 
                                               
36 The modern natural law jurisprudence of Grotius and Hobbes intensifies the mentalist element of 
Aquinas‘ natural law, rather than completely breaking with it. See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and 
Peace ed. Richard Tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), Chapter I and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan ed. 
R. Tuck. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  
37 The same assertion is made by Kant‘s and Hegel‘s legal rationalism. [References] 
38 Aquinas, op. cit., Q.91, Art. 1. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.   
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who endowed it with a share of his reason, of the law under which it lives. It is important 
to note that although natural law binds in conscience, human conscience is not perfect. 
Thus, though universally cogent, the efficacy of natural law makes room for a certain 
degree of anomie. Aquinas explains the failure to comply perfectly with the precepts of 
natural law as the result of the operation of two factors. The first is the generality and 
universality of the precepts of natural law, which require determination and 
particularization respectively. Between the imprecise/general and the precise/particular 
lies the operation of the fallible human mind. The second reason for the ever partial 
compliance with natural law is the disturbing influence of the passions, this ever present 
reminder of humankind‘s second, animal, nature.  
 
For Aquinas, human law (positive law)42 is the human way of dealing, by the 
exercise of what amounts to only a hint of God‘s perfect reason, with the problems of 
generalization, universalization, and anomie. In this jurisprudential framework, human 
law must be derived from natural law as a logical ―conclusion from premises‖ or as a 
―determination of certain generalities.‖43 The problem of anomie is explained as the 
product of an imperfectly honed virtue which fails to shield itself from the influence of 
untamed passions. In order to perfect virtues, Aquinas recommends a ―training, which 
compels through fear of punishment,‖ that which is ―the discipline of laws.‖44 Human 
law is thus a human-made artifact in the service of natural law enforcement.  
 
As a product of human reason for the purposes established by natural law, human 
law is, of course, bound to suffer from imperfections of conception and application. 
Because human law, as practical reason, is by definition preoccupied with practical 
affairs, it will certainly fail to achieve the infallibility of science. Mistakes, Aquinas 
contends, are thus to be expected in matters of practical reason. Consequently, 
immaculate perfection is not to be expected of human law, but only constant 
improvement - a perfectibility which ―is possible in its own particular genus.‖45 
 
Moreover, Aquinas submits, human law cannot and should not cover the entire 
immense and sorrowful territory of human vices, but only those carrying grave social 
consequences.46 The vices to be repressed by human law are those affecting the common 
good - those with a public implication. All vices with private consequences only (or 
primarily) are to be left alone by positive law. They constitute the proper domain of 
divine law, the fourth kind of law in Aquinas‘ jurisprudence. 
 
Aquinas‘ anthropology maintains that humankind is naturally committed to the 
common good, ―ordained‖ as it is to the end of eternal happiness, which can only be 
reached by following God‘s direct guidance through the language of law. In addition to 
providing firm guidance to souls struggling to earn salvation in the form of a heavenly 
                                               
42 Ibid., Q.91, Art. 3. 
43 Ibid., Q. 95, Art. 2.   
44 Ibid., Q. 95, Art. 1.   
45 Ibid., Q. 91, Art. 3.   
46 Ibid., Q. 96, Art. 2.   
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afterlife, divine law has yet a second role in Thomistic jurisprudence. It assists in the 
correction of problems created by the fallibility and natural idiosyncrasies of human 
judgment as it tries to determine the content of natural law and to cope with the duty to 
posit a human law in accordance with natural law. Because divine laws were revealed by 
God through the medium of prophets, they cannot possibly err. Therefore, divine law, 
which is universal in reach, can offer untainted insight into the nature of goodness and 
unimpeachable certainty about which practices and intentions have redeeming value.   
 
There is yet another problem to be addressed by divine law. Let us call this the 
problem of the double requirement of virtue:47 ―man is not competent to judge of interior 
movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the 
perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of 
acts.‖48 Divine law, whose perfection reflects the perfection of its lawgiver, is able to 
provide a trusted path to redemption and ultimate salvation via virtue. 
   
Finally, as noted above, it would be neither possible nor desirable for human laws 
to punish all evils. Such a comprehensive punitive system would, unavoidably, have to 
work against the common good in many circumstances.49 However, in order that no vice 
remains unpunished or incentivized, divine law makes whole the cosmic order by 
decreeing every sin forbidden.50 There is no doubt that anomie also threatens divine law, 
but the punishment it carries never fails; as, Aquinas reassures us, God‘s judgment never 
fails. 
 
The integrative and systemic nature of the four types of law in Aquinas‘s 
jurisprudence sets the stage for his subjectivist turn in the concept of cruelty. Aquinas‘ 
classical natural law represents a sustained legal-philosophical effort to conceive of a 
system that, in its kaleidoscopic normativity, could claim to be the only correct and 
complete ordinance of things and beings by practical reason and binding in human 
conscience. Nothing less than such a superimposing and gapless legal apparatus is 
required by the predicament of beings whose understanding of God is only deep enough 
to develop a conscious awareness of their own decayed condition. What place do virtues 
opposed to cruelty occupy in such a system? How does their place help explain the 
subjectivist turn inside the first model of practical reason in the rejection of cruelty?  
   
                                               
47It is interesting to note the similarity here with Kant‘s practical philosophy in which morality, binding in 
conscience as it is supposed to be, receives the complement of law, which binds the deeds only. See his 
three ―Introductions,‖ the general one to the work and the two specific ones to the part on law and the part 
on virtues, respectively, in his The Metaphysics of Morals in Immanuel Kant Practical Philosophy. Trans. 
and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). About the dependence of morals 
on laws see Tony Honoré (citation).  
48 Aquinas, Q.91, Art. 4.  
49 Here the similarity is, interestingly enough, with John Stuart Mill‘s liberalism. See, on this point, his On 
Liberty in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998). 
50 Aquinas, Q.91, Art.3. 
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In a first approximation, Aquinas raises the problem of cruelty as a deviation from 
the natural ordering of human affairs. He does this in two Questions (dedicated to the 
virtue of temperance) in the Summa Theologiae – Question 157, entitled De Clementia et 
Mansuetudine, and Question 159, entitled De Crudelitate – in which he directly 
interrogates Seneca‘s ideas on cruelty (treating them sometimes almost as a medium for 
Aristotle). A fundamental difference that emerges relates to the requirements of virtue. 
Whereas, as discussed above, Seneca sets the two necessary requirements of compliance 
in mind and in action for a deed to be considered virtuous, Aquinas relaxes, for specific 
virtues such as temperance, the outcome requirement. Anti-consequentialist, he dispenses 
with the results of courses of action when assessing their moral value and the virtue of 
their agents. Hence, Aquinas‘ jurisprudence does not require that deeds intended to 
relieve suffering achieve palpable success. Its only requirements are a righteous intention 
and sincere attempt. This is in line with the precedence Aquinas gives to the mind over 
the body in the mind-body problem in medieval philosophy. 
 
 Another distinction between Seneca and Aquinas is related to the first and is 
equally important. It bears on the problem of the motivation to act virtuously. In the 
architecture of Aquinas‘s conception of cruelty, although the virtues of mercy, piety, and 
clemency51 express an inclination toward the relief of suffering, they originate from 
different motives. While piety is motivated by reverence for God, and mercy by 
compassion (that is, by the capacity to empathize with the suffering of others), clemency 
is motivated by judgment, where judgment is a sense of proportion and moderation of the 
mind operating under the tutelage of natural reason. It is through a judgment of 
proportion and moderation that clement relief of suffering is provided. Since proportion 
is a measure taken in light of a general standard (natural law in this case), relief of 
suffering is by definition motivated by a consideration alien to the passive experience of 
the agony of pain. Therefore, relief of torment is required by clemency, independent of 
the intention, even if righteous, of the agent who inflicts it. Herein lays the objectivist 
element in Aquinas‘ conception who, like Seneca, sees the world through the lenses of an 
objective normative order. 
 
Aquinas begins the Question on De Crudelitate with two guiding queries. The 
first is ―whether [cruelty] is the opposite of clemency‖52 and the second is ―how [cruelty] 
compares with ferocity and savagery.‖53 His answers to these questions further reveal the 
subjective element in his concept of cruelty. As I show, Aquinas opposes cruelty to both 
clemency and mercy.  
 
Aquinas starts with Clemency. Since cruelty is a problem of punitive excess, as it 
was for Seneca,  it would seem that cruelty is not a counterpart to clemency but to mercy. 
However, Aquinas argues that clemency, as part of the virtue of temperance and not of 
justice, has to do not with equity, as mercy does, but with a mild disposition of the spirit - 
                                               
51 There would be a point to be made on the Latin words translated into ―mercy,‖ ―pardon,‖ and 
―clemency‖ in Aquinas and Seneca. I will excuse myself from doing it here. 
52 Ibid., Q. 159, Art. 1. 
53 Ibid., Q. 159, Art 2. 
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a state of mind. However, this conclusion is only one part of the general structure of 
Aquinas‘s argument. His objective is to make cruelty not only an injustice, but also a vice 
contrary to temperance, contrary to a balanced disposition of temperament. The reason 
why Aquinas would want to place cruelty under temperance rather than justice is the 
foregrounding of the agent‘s mental disposition in the definition of cruelty. Whereas for 
Seneca conflict with public good is a sufficient condition for a finding of vice, for 
Aquinas a special state of mind must obtain. It is in the intersection of what 
phenomenologically occurs with that which takes place invisibly in the inner citadel of 
the conscience that determines the cruelty of a deed. It is precisely in this subjective 
requirement54 that the agent-subjective conception of cruelty finds both its semantic and 
normative cores. 
 
Aquinas illustrates the mentalist element he brings to cruelty with an etymological 
argument. Here, again, the natural lawyer‘s appreciation of proportion is in operation. 
However, instead of geometrical analogies to describe the social order, Aquinas appeals 
to a sensorial analogy – tasting. The analogy with tasting is deployed as a way to 
overcome the difficulty in making cruelty the direct opposite to both clemency and 
mercy, as Seneca does. The point of the analogy depends on the etymological derivation 
of the word cruelty from “cruditas,” that is, rawness. In this analogy, clemency ―denotes 
a certain smoothness or sweetenes of soul,‖ which inspires the mitigation of the punitive 
mind, whereas cruelty reflects sourness and bitterness of taste similar to that of 
unprepared food,55 a bitterness that upsets the balance of reason and passions in the 
direction of savagery. 
 
 However, Aquinas makes both clemency and mercy oppose cruelty. His argument 
is familiar territory to jurists: he distinguishes cases and divides competencies. The 
structure of the argument here rests upon several categories: just or unjust punishment, 
internally excessive or externally excessive punishment, mercy, clemency, and cruelty. 
Just punishment is that which is legal and rational. To prospectively soften this type of 
punishment in accordance with sound reason is equity proper, and to do so in a case in 
point is to act mercifully. Like Seneca, As unjust punishment fails the test of rationality 
and legality, among its defects are the problems of internal and external excess in 
punishing.    
 
Moreover, the rectification of unjust punishment is a matter of equity, hence of 
mercy. Cruelty in this conceptual scheme refers to the state of mind that, contrary to the 
prescriptions of mercy, delights in ―excess in punishing‖ and, contrary to what clemency 
commands to the conscience, yields to a ―hardness of heart, which makes one ready to 
increase punishment.‖56 Cruelty is then the intemperate mental disposition that seeks 
injustice in punishment. As with Seneca‘s conception of cruelty, Aquinas‘s clearly 
                                               
54 Ibid., Q. 157, Art. 3. 
55 Ibid., Q. 159, Art. 1.  
56 Ibid., Q. 159, Art. 1.  
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restricts it to the domain of punishment - a situation which would start to change only in 
the eighteenth-century.57  
 
 On the second question, as to whether cruelty and savagery differ, Aquinas gives 
a provisional no – cruelty is the same as savagery. This provisional answer is in line with 
most ancient virtue philosophies, including Seneca‘s: for each virtue there is only one 
contrasting vice. Indeed, if cruelty and savagery are opposed to clemency, as Aquinas 
affirms they are, they would necessarily appear the same.58 However, Aquinas is a 
philosopher concerned with human fault and redemption. Animal inclinations such as 
savagery are neither vices nor virtues. They constitute an indelible stain on God‘s rational 
creation, reminding humanity of its decayed condition. No matter how honorable the 
human condition is in comparison with other creatures, humanity‘s membership in the 
animal kingdom condemns it to experience, in the fragile and transitory existences of 
individuals, animal drives as well as God‘s enlightenment. This predicament renders each 
person susceptible to salvation solely in relation to that which in him is godlike – the rest 
is his fate. Fate rules, though, only until God intervenes. To the inhuman character of 
savagery, only another equally inhuman virtue can be opposed, a virtue that is a gift of 
God: piety. Hence, savagery and piety are, respectively, the attributes of two categories 
of inhuman beings: beasts and saints.59 
  
 To summarize, Aquinas agrees with Seneca that punishment is the proper domain 
of cruelty and that natural law guides practical reason in matters of vice and virtue. In the 
axis softness  mercy  clemency  cruelty, the virtuous middle is found in mercy 
and clemency. The vice of cruelty obtains when the agent of excessive punishment 
derives pleasure from the torments he inflicts on his victims. Mercy is a rational decision 
to relieve suffering caused by punishment, and clemency the disposition of temper 
leading to mercy. Finally, because natural law binds in conscience, an adequate concept 
of cruelty has to incorporate a subjective element.  
 
 Aquinas‘ agent-subjectivism narrows the agent-based conception of cruelty. 
Where Seneca relied upon behavior in violation of an objective norm for a finding of 
cruelty, Aquinas internalized natural law‘s compliance requirements. According to agent-
subjectivism, unless and until the conscience missteps, no cruelty can be found, even if 
otherwise cruel outcomes are present. Although Aquinas‘ mentalism emerged in the 
                                               
57 See Foucault‘s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1995) 
for the history of this change. 
58 Ibid., Q. 159, Art. 2. 
59 ―Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human 
wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestisality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to 
clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher [Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 
5] calls heroic or god-like, which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. 
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.‖  Ibid. Also, ―Properly 
speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of 
the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man‘s torture. Consequently it is evident 
that it is comprised under bestiality: but suchlike pleasure is not human but bestial. […] On the other hand, 
cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: 
wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality.‖ Ibid. 
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context of specific ancient and medieval philosophical problems, it anticipated a broader 
movement in modern crime doctrine, which foregrounds mens rea vis-à-vis behavioral 
models of criminal responsibility. But cruelty and liability for crimes are not the same. 
They speak to different moral and legal intuitions and principles. Hence, whereas 
subjectivism expanded the overlap between modern crime theory and theories of justice, 
subjectivism has a reductionist effect on the concept of cruelty. It is thus unsurprising that 
whenever courts decide to narrow the basis for findings of cruelty, they seek refuge in the 
agent-subjective conception.60  
 
 The elegance of Aquinas‘ jurisprudence is to be admired. However, a model of 
practical reason in criminal law premising agent-based conceptions of cruelty on the 
existence of an objective normative order that tells vice and virtues apart is inadequate for 
multicultural societies living under liberal democratic systems of criminal and 
constitutional law. This is increasingly true for international criminal law and human 
rights systems. Indeed, such a model has considerable theological, metaphysical, and 
jurisprudential problems to resolve before it can get off the ground.  
 
 Furthermore, on the cultural front, agent-objective and agent-subjective 
conceptions of cruelty cannot capture all instances of cruelty that our moral and legal 
outlooks can now detect. Case law shows that courts on both sides of the Atlantic have 
discovered this shortcoming. A model of practical reason is certain to fail if it seeks to 
resolve all problems of personal predicament that impact human dignity by focusing on 
the agent side of the agent-victim relation. Focusing instead on the victim side of this 
relation is an expected reaction to the perception that the previous model of practical 
reason has been exhausted. But how would cruelty look from the victim side of this 
relation - from a perspective that relies comparatively less on the legality and morality of 
cruel agency, with its intricate economy of vices and virtues, and more on insight into 
what it must feel like to suffer cruelly, no matter at whose hands?  
  
  
 
III. SECOND MODEL OF PRACTICAL REASON: CRUELTY AS  
  SUFFERING  
 
 
E.  CONCEPTION 3: VICTIM-SUBJECTIVE  
 
 
 The victim-subjective conception of cruelty, which we owe to Montaigne, turned 
the table on agent-based conceptions. Victim subjectivism presupposes cruel agency, thus 
remaining also an agent-dependent conception. However, the definitional element of 
cruelty rests in the victim‘s intense experience of suffering. Cognitively, compassion is 
the key impulse in the identification of instances of cruelty. The model of practical reason 
associated with victim subjectivism stipulates that sensibility counts more than reason. 
                                               
60 See Paulo Barrozo, “The Foundations of Constitutional Punishment”, op. cit. 
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Consequently, the perspective from which to understand cruelty is that of the suffering 
subject. In the context of punishment, cruelty obtains when someone subject to punitive 
agency experiences severe suffering. More recently, the requirement of intent to cause 
suffering has been relaxed.61 
  
Montaigne‘s essay on cruelty is shorter than Seneca‘s or Aquinas‘s.62 His 
intellectual style is less assertive, his prose less pompous, and his analyses, at points, less 
coherent63 than theirs. His essay is, nonetheless, astonishing. Much of the current 
understanding of cruelty is a cultural heir of the perspective on cruelty that Montaigne 
helped bring to the center of modern culture, particularly the sense of guilt for the 
suffering of others. 64 
 
While I focus on the conception of cruelty Montaigne contributed, it is important 
to keep in mind that he was one of the first modern thinkers to put forward a completely 
non-metaphysical conception of law and a contextualizing and demystifying conception 
of legal authority.65 This matters because when law and customary norms are contextual 
and their authority culture-specific, focus tends naturally to be directed to the differences 
that tangibly matter, such as, in the case of Montaigne, suffering. Rather than the 
theologically and metaphysically charged model of practical reason found in Seneca and 
Aquinas, Montaigne embraces a lighter, expressionist approach to ―morals.‖  In his moral 
outlook, Montaigne relies more on the cultivation of sensibilities, and on the heightening 
of the sense of guilt, than on engaging in the sometimes too-arid philosophical debates 
about norms, behavior, and intentions. Montaigne knew that, as Smith came to articulate 
it in the eighteenth-century, ―no action can be properly called virtuous, which is not 
accompanied with the sentiment of self-approbation.‖66 It is precisely this sentiment of 
self-approbation that a sense of guilt in relation to cruelty would encumber. Ultimately, 
this encumbrance makes cruelty incompatible with virtue – a frugal argument, for certain, 
but one that is so by design.  
 
                                               
61 See Brown v. Plata. I discuss the mens rea requirement of cruelty in Paulo Barrozo, “The Foundations of 
Constitutional Punishment,” op. cit.  
62 An analysis of Montaigne‘s ideas on law, customs, natural and social orders, etc. would be of course 
helpful in the contextualization of his innovation on the theme of cruelty.  It cannot, unfortunately, be done 
within the bounds of this essay. 
63 Montaigne, it should not be forgotten, is a self-proclaimed champion of contradictions in thought, if 
thought is to better reflect life as it is.  
64 Speaking about the origins and nature of our civilization, Freud sought to ―represent the sense of guilt as 
the most important problem‖ in its development. The price paid by the cultural availability of the sense of 
guilt was, according to Freud, very high indeed: ―for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness 
through the heightening of the sense of guilt.” Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, transl. by 
James Strachey (New York and London, Norton, 1989), 97. For insight into this sense of guilt see Friedrich 
Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
65 As is well known, Montaigne has much to say about laws and customs in his peculiar form of legal 
historicism. However, the new normative vista opened by his take on cruelty does not require explication of 
his legal thought the same way Aquinas‘ did.   
66 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982), 179. 
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 Montaigne was a skeptical philosopher. For him, the prevailing conditions of 
moral relativism and sensorial illusion were inescapable. He was also conservative in 
politics. Whereas moral relativism and liberty of thought are to be enjoyed privately, 
actual conduct must comply with customary norms. It is beside the point to speculate, in 
the present context, about whether Montaigne‘s conservatism followed from his 
skepticism or his skepticism from his conservatism. The fact is that for Montaigne the 
routinized experience of privacy and the uniqueness of each person engender radically 
idiosyncratic worldviews. The resulting moral pluralism profoundly mistrusts any form 
of universalism.  
 
 Montaigne‘s skepticism found refuge and consolation in abiding by what Hume 
used to call the common affairs of life67 and in the cultivation of compassion, both 
common themes in early modern humanism. The inclination toward ordinary life brought 
along, in Montaigne‘s case, a relentless defense of the actual normative structure of 
society: customs, which included the laws, long established habits and social manners, 
and morality in general. Naturally, this defense of the actual social arrangement goes well 
with a skepticism that is phobic of social invention, as is Montaigne‘s. 
  
 Montaigne would only moderate his defense of the social status quo under the 
recommendation of compassion. Even if, from a cognitive point of view, universalism is 
impossible, there is still no a priori impossibility of experiencing the feelings of fellow 
beings. It was in the capacity to represent the feelings – co-passio – of other creatures, 
not in the impossibility of importing and internalizing their worldviews, that Montaigne 
would find inspiration to favor efforts to mitigate the horrors of existing social 
arrangement, despite his conservatism. It is in this context that Montaigne‘s thought on 
cruelty and the accompanying model of practical reason is to be understood.   
 
 Like Aquinas, Montaigne studied Seneca. In fact, he starts his essay on cruelty by 
copying directly from Seneca‘s style in De Clementia. As Seneca‘s style was determined 
by the urge to both educate and sensitize Nero, Montaigne‘s style was designed to 
                                               
67 ―But what have I here said, that reflections very refin‘d and metaphysical have little or no influence upon 
us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my present feeling and experience. 
The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon 
me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion 
even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my 
existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? 
What beings surround me? And on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am 
confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition 
imaginable, inviron‘d with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv‘d of the use of every member and 
faculty.[…] Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature 
herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by 
relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all 
these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when 
after three or four hour‘s amusement, I wou‘d return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and 
strain‘d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. Here then I find myself 
absolutely and necessarily determin‘d to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of 
life.‖  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 268-269. 
  
24 
sensitize an audience who could hardly care less about the jurisprudential intricacies of a 
notion of cruelty. But while Seneca‘s audience was constituted in the first place by Nero, 
a person placed in a very special circumstance, Montaigne‘s audience was the ordinary 
person, the person who, in his or her mundane existence, was neither philosopher nor 
saint. Indeed, the ordinary person is alien to the thought that ―it is more beautiful to 
prevent the birth of temptations by a sublime and god-like resolve.‖68 Uncommon is also 
the possession of an ―affable nature,‖ a personality ―which of itself finds indulgence and 
vice distasteful‖69 and is therefore naturally unsuited for it. Montaigne, in his effort to 
befriend his audience, placed himself among the latter, for, as he confessed, he would 
find ―in many cases more rule and order in my morals than in my opinions, and my 
appetites less debauched than my reason.‖70 
 
 For the ordinary person who was neither philosopher nor saint, virtue had to be 
won. Indeed, a mark of the model of practical reason from within which Montaigne 
writes is the redefinition of virtue as something earned in battle, for ―virtue rejects ease as 
a companion.‖ Virtue finds its foundation in the victory of the gentle part of the self over 
the part that internalizes socially conditioned and naturally developed desires that resist 
compassion. Unless there is a struggle against the self to avoid vice and do good, virtue 
does not obtain: virtue's path is ―rough and thorny.‖71 Without this internal struggle, 
virtuous conduct is an aberration, an epiphenomenon of a god-like philosophical mind 
and resolve or of a personality whose original appetites coincidentally and naturally 
harmonize with the requirements of morality. That is why the two extremes of the ―god-
like resolve‖ and the ―affable nature‖ are only borderline cases for virtue.   
 
 Having established his audience as consisting of the multitude of ignorant 
ordinary people living in the battlegrounds where virtue needs to be earned by actively 
conquering the social and natural forces of vice, and having defined the central case of 
virtue as a struggle by imperfect but well-intended natures to overcome vice and to 
instantiate that which is good, Montaigne is finally ready to apply his model of practical 
reason to the topic of cruelty. And he does this in the usual confessional tone to be found 
everywhere in his essay, proclaiming that of all vices ―both by nature and judgment I 
have a cruel hatred of cruelty.‖ Note that the skeptic in Montaigne finds it safer to rely on 
sensibility than reason: ―I am so soft that I cannot even see anyone lop the head off a 
chicken without displeasure, and cannot bear to hear a hare squealing when my hounds 
get their teeth into it.‖72 Incidentally, similar moral pessimism is found in the anti-cruelty 
liberal tradition mentioned above.  
 
 When Montaigne attributes his hatred of cruelty to his natural softness, he is 
already electing compassion – a sentiment that will be so important to Rousseau, Smith, 
and Hume later on – to lead the revolt against the vice of cruelty. The faculty of 
                                               
68 Michel de Montaigne, ―On Cruelty,‖ in The Complete Essays, trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 
1991), 476-477. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 479. 
71 Montaigne, op. cit., 474. 
72 Ibid., 480-481. 
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representation is fundamental in the operation of compassion. It is the image of the 
decapitated chicken or the sound of the squealing hare that, through the senses of sight 
and hearing, make it real to observers the pain and suffering of another being. This is by 
definition the job of representation: to make it possible to import into one‘s mind the 
feelings of others. And once this enlargement of one‘s sensory universe to incorporate the 
pain and terror of others is completed, one is bound to see the world from the perspective 
of suffering. 
 
 However, as he learned from Seneca and Aquinas, the vice of cruelty is 
understandable only as a derivation of cruelty itself. It is therefore necessary to first know 
what cruelty is before one becomes capable of evaluating courses of action prone to cause 
it. At this point in his argument, Montaigne‘s conceptual crafting is much less seamless 
than that of Seneca and Aquinas. Montaigne does not offer a conception of cruelty 
comparable, in jurisprudential detail and complexity, to those of Seneca or Aquinas. 
What Montaigne does is simply to place the suffering of the victim at the core of the 
conception of cruelty. According to him, it is in the act of causing suffering, in the actual 
victimization, and while it happens, that cruelty takes place. There is no cruelty, no 
matter how unbalanced a course of action or the state of mind of its agent, unless 
suffering is present. Montaigne‘s conception of cruelty is, of course, as much agent-
dependent as Seneca‘s and Aquinas‘s depended on a presupposition of the victim‘s 
suffering. What accounts for the analytical distinction among their conceptions is the 
foregrounding and backgrounding of semantic and normative choices that place either the 
victim of cruelty in his suffering or the agent of cruelty in his behavior or state of mind at 
the center of the concept of cruelty. In opposition to Seneca and Aquinas, all allusions to 
acts or states of mind are subjected to the controlling criterion of suffering. It is suffering 
that gives to the acts and omissions causally linked to it their ultimate cruel nature. ―If I 
had not seen it,‖ says Montaigne, ―I could hardly have made myself believe that you 
could find souls so monstrous that they would commit murder for the sheer fun of it.‖ 
However, it is in ―the pitiful gestures and twitchings of a man dying in agony, while 
hearing his screams and groans‖ that one finds ―the farthest point that cruelty can 
reach.‖73 Were it not for the screams and groans of a suffering victim, there would be no 
cruelty, despite any normative breach or psychological enjoyment on the part of a 
murderer. Without the victim‘s extreme suffering, the same acts, previously condemnable 
as cruelty, transubstantiate into innocent ones. Hence Montaigne's proposal that in order 
for the polity to abstain from cruelty while still achieving the ends of punishment, 
―exemplary severity intended to keep the populace to their duty would be practiced not 
on criminals but on their corpses.‖ 74 In the victim-subjective conception of cruelty, the 
state of mind of agents adds just a qualification to cruelty, a degree, as it were, of blame 
for the vice of cruelty. 
 
 In place of an analysis of what kind of suffering the definition of cruelty requires 
or an interrogation of what kind of causational weight would be required before 
                                               
73 Ibid., 484. 
74 Ibid., 483.  
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considering an act or omission cruel, Montaigne simply appeals to human sensibility.75 
This sensibility is, however, capable of education. The training of sensibilities to identify 
and rebel against cruelty, to earn virtue by battling vice, prescribes a respect for all 
sentient creatures, for ―natures given to bloodshed where beasts are concerned bear 
witness to an inborn propensity to cruelty.‖76 But Montaigne does not restrict the 
education of sensibilities to a concern toward sentient beings for, as he submits, ―there is 
a kind of respect and a duty in man as a genus which link us not merely to the beasts 
which have life and feelings, but even to trees and plants.‖ In extending the obligation of 
respect and consideration to the whole of nature, Montaigne seems to indicate that 
passions have the potential, even if necessarily meager, for some moral universalization 
not present in reason. 
 
 In conclusion, while compassion is the key impulse in the identification of 
cruelty, the suffering of victims is the necessary, although not the sufficient (since his 
conception is also agent-dependent), definitional element of cruelty. The political impact 
of this conception of cruelty and the urge that accompanies it to educate sensibilities is 
immense. One does not need to look far in order to identify heirs of Montaigne‘s 
compassionate conservatism. Because compassion could conceivably reach a degree of 
moral generalization for which moral and cognitive idiosyncrasies ill-prepared 
humankind, it becomes the instrument par excellence for the moderation of the most 
extreme effects of what it takes to keep and reproduce the social status quo. If knowledge 
and moral cognitivism are not to be relied upon for the betterment of society, compassion 
is.   
  
However right or wrong Montaigne may be, because of his cultural importance 
and literary felicity, there can be no complete retreat from his conception of cruelty and 
the sort of sensibility it helped create and nourish. Furthermore, the model of practical 
reason from which Montaigne writes is remarkably distinct from that of Seneca and 
Aquinas. Once the perspective of the suffering subject of cruelty was brought into the 
normative imagination, a whole new normative territory was open for colonization - a 
territory in which we are to this day willing settlers. And Montaigne accomplished all this 
while leaving untouched the theological, metaphysical, and jurisprudential questions 
Seneca and Aquinas sought so hard to resolve. The prestige of the victim-subjective 
conception of cruelty and its influence in criminal law cannot be overestimated. And yet, 
it is counter-intuitive in its call to background agency and insufficient to conceptually 
capture all the instances of cruelty relevant to criminal law and punishment.  
 
Would it be possible to imagine a conception of cruelty that could reach beyond 
active agency and its motivations and beyond the actual and conscious suffering of 
victims?  If at all possible, how would such a conception impact our normative vistas and 
                                               
75 ―I feel the most tender compassion for the affliction of others and would readily weep from fellow-
feeling […]. Nothing tempts my tears like tears – not only real ones but tears of any kind, in feint or paint. I 
scarcely ever lament for the dead: I would be more inclined to envy them; but I do make great lamentations 
for the dying. Savages do not upset me so much by roasting and eating the bodies of the dead as those 
persecutors do who torture the bodies of the living.‖ Ibid., 482. 
76 Ibid., 485. 
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the development of criminal law? What model of practical reason would render such a 
conception of cruelty compelling? 
  
 
IV. THIRD MODEL OF PRACTICAL REASON: CRUELTY AS   
  PREDICAMENT  
 
 
F. CONCEPTION 4: VICTIM-OBJECTIVE, AGENT-INDEPENDENT 
 
 
 If the life of law is not solely logic, it is not solely pragmatism either.77 Reflective 
progress is a force to be contended with in the evolution of criminal law. The concept of 
cruelty is a case in point. The push of reflectivity lays bare the limitations of agent and 
victim-based conceptions of cruelty and the models of practical reason they inhabit. By 
relying on objective norms (either as natural law as a foundation for an ethics of virtues 
or as hegemonic social morality), agent-based conceptions either beg or base on faith the 
question of the authority of those norms. To the extent that the agent-based conception is 
subjectivized, it raises, on one hand, the bar for a finding of cruelty too high to 
accommodate the evolution of the rejection of cruelty and, on the other, creates an 
incentive for elective blindness in relation to the cruelty one causes or allows to take 
place.78 By relying on the suffering of victims, victim-subjective conceptions of cruelty 
fail to capture instances of cruelty in which the victim is deprived of his senses or 
consciousness about his predicament. The fourth conception of cruelty and the model of 
practical reason that gives meaning to it seek to address these limitations. They transcend 
discrete agency and conscious suffering as the core definitional elements of cruelty. In 
the victim-objective/agent-independent conception of cruelty, agency is transcended into 
structural causation and suffering is transcended into violation of human dignity.   
  
The chief concern of the first three conceptions of cruelty is to tame power‘s 
propensity for brutality and its constant disregard for the pain of others. The fourth 
conception broadens this initial concern to include preoccupation with free and inviolable 
individual existences. I argue that the push of reflectivity is the force behind this 
broadening of the conception of cruelty. The point is simple: if you start from a position 
that accepts reasons for constraining agents of cruelty, and thought hard enough about 
them – avoiding inconsistencies, unleashing normative entailments, spelling out practical 
requirements, and seeking universalizability79 – you will arrive at an agent-independent, 
victim-objective concept of cruelty.  The point may be simple, but the third model of 
practical reason is a conceptually complex and normatively contested terrain in which the 
fourth conception of cruelty has to be articulated against the backdrop of changed legal 
                                               
77 See Oliver Wendell Holmes‘ ―The Path of the Law.‖  Harvard Law Review 10, no. 8 (1897): 457-478. 
78 This is one of the problems with the agent-subjective conception of cruelty in the Supreme Court‘s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See the quotes in the Introduction and Paulo Barrozo, “Foundations of 
Constitutional Punishment,” op. cit. 
79 In the Kantian sense of a capacity of special normative formulations to be made universally required and 
valid. More on Kant‘s moral universalism is infra. 
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thought and experience, transformed cultural patterns, value pluralism, and expanded, 
although also more strained, means of social cohesion and solidarity. 
 
In the fourth conception, cruelty refers to severe violations of the respect, 
recognition, and care that the unconditional and inherent dignity of each and every 
individual commands. The violation can be attributable to personified agency and 
identifiable intention, or to the existence and operation of impersonal factors that shape 
the circumstances of the victims of cruelty, rendering them relatively more vulnerable to 
such violations. These impersonal factors are deemed defective in light of the cruelty they 
engender or facilitate or, with respect to the vulnerability they create, in light of the 
requirements of just forms of interaction or collective life that they fail to meet. In the 
context of punishment, according to the victim-objective/agent-independent conception, 
cruelty occurs when a grave violation of human dignity that in normal circumstances 
would reach the pain threshold for cruelty is caused by individuals or by the operation of 
impersonal institutions, structures or social processes, even if the victim is unaware of his 
predicament.  
 
In this section I focus, first, on how the preoccupation with punitive agency and 
intention led to the interrogation of structural, system-wide conditions of punishment. In 
the sequence, I address questions of human dignity and vulnerability.80 Once suffering-
causing agency is set under moral and legal scrutiny, and a concern with suffering is 
given legal and moral priority, reflectivity forces consideration of structural causation and 
suffering-independent reasons to care for others. When seen from this perspective, the 
rejection of cruelty in criminal law takes the form of a rejection of disrespect for the 
dignity of individuals, especially through brutality, neglect, exploitation, and subjection.    
  
Analyzes of the model of practical reason that sees cruelty as a predicament 
requires that insights be gathered from different authors. For example, what in Montaigne 
was an empathetic preoccupation with suffering is transformed in Kant to a thesis about 
universal and unconditional human dignity, a dignity achieved by mere membership in 
the species.81 In another example, in Marx and Mill, what was in Seneca and Aquinas a 
concern with virtuous and vicious agency in the context of punishment is transmuted into 
questions about positive and negative structural conditions for justice, emancipation, and 
empowerment. These authors operated largely within a semantic menu that, although 
kindred to cruelty as a concept, never systematically employed it, nor provided any 
sustained conceptual analysis of it. Nonetheless, their influence on jurisprudence of 
cruelty in criminal law was tectonic. 
 
& 
 
                                               
80 Germany is the leading contemporary constitutional experience in developing and enforcing a legal 
conception of human dignity. Article 1 (Protection of human dignity) of the Basic Law for the Federal 
Republic of Germany reads “The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and to protect it shall be the duty 
of all public authority.” 
81 Later to be extended, under the pressure of the accusation of specism, to complex animal life in general. 
See, in this regard, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York, NY: Ecco, 2002). 
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If concern for the suffering of others is not merely instinctive, as I argue it is not, 
why should we care? What is the normative basis for caring for the unbeknownst other in 
the way we often do? If this normative basis existed and could be found, would it render 
any obligations valid even when the individual in relation to whom we are obligated is 
not consciously suffering? The third model of practical reason in the rejection of cruelty 
provides compelling answers to these questions. Kant is the central figure in the 
articulation of this model. His Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals recounts the 
odyssey of practical reason that, by forces internal to itself, is condemned to 
dissatisfaction in relation to its ordinary powers, seeking in critical-reflectivity the 
uncontaminated sources of duty, and a glimpse into the nature of unconditional goodness. 
It is not, for Kant, that tested common opinion and ordinary reasoning are incapable of 
distinguishing good from evil, or plotting courses of action consistent with this 
distinction. The problem, for him, lies in the ease with which innocence is ―seduced‖ by 
inclinations, interests, and all sorts of incentives foreign to the command of idealized 
duty itself.82 This seduction of mundane goodness is aggravated by what Kant calls a 
―natural dialectic,‖ that is, the rationalization of the seduction so as to render the original 
strictness of duty-imposing practical norms more amenable to contingent consideration of 
utilities.   
 
There is, however, another dialectic in action in the operation of ordinary practical 
reason: the dialectic of reflection.  This dialectic ―is an essential principle of every use of 
our reason to push its cognition to consciousness of its necessity.‖83 This reflective 
folding of reason upon itself in search of assurances about the validity of its contents is 
the very element of transition from uncritical to critical morality. Whereas the judgments 
and opinions of uncritical morality or mere moral sensibility suffer, in Kant‘s view, from 
the undue influence of the transitory forces of mundane experience, critical morality, 
when successful, is able to reach and articulate axioms that stand a priori in relation to 
experience and enjoy the seal of rational necessity. On the basis of this twofold pillar of 
independence from experience and rational necessity, Kant builds the idea of inherent 
dignity and its derivative duties, for a ―duty in general – lies, prior to all experience, in 
the idea of a reason determining the will by means of a priori grounds.‖84 
 
To the independence and necessity of the postulates of critical morality, Kant 
adds the requirement of universality, which refers not only to the unconditioned validity 
of moral norms, but also to a heuristic for,85 and the boundaries of the jurisdiction of, 
these norms. The reflective conscience‘s representation to itself of a postulate of practical 
reason that meets the simultaneous criteria of a priori and universal rational necessity is, 
in Kantian ethics, the representation of a law, ―insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect 
[of the duty performed as required by it] is the determining ground of the will.‖ Hence, a 
                                               
82 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 59.  
83 Ibid., 108, emphasis omitted.  
84 Ibid, 62. 
85 ―I do not, therefore, need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have to do in order that my volition be 
morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for whatever might 
come to pass in it, I ask myself only: can you also will that your maxim become a universal law?‖  Ibid, 57-
58. 
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will so determined by an a priori and rationally necessary universal law is the primary, 
absolute moral good, a good which, it must follow, ―is already present in the person 
himself who acts in accordance with this representation.‖86  
 
 In this scheme of practical reason, virtues of moderation such as those Seneca 
eulogized are insufficient at best. Wisdom and wit are indeed desirable and frequently 
useful, explains Kant, but also efficient instruments of evil and harm if the will behind 
them is not itself good.87 A good will is the basis of goodness, for, as noted above, it 
represents to itself as law the principles of practical reasonableness forged by reason 
aprioristically, before experience, and universally desirable and binding. Once a good 
will represents such a principle as law, it determines itself solely on the basis of the duty 
commanded by that principle. In Kant, the reliance on contextual judgment and virtues is 
transcended into the requirement that the agent‘s will be intrinsically good on the basis of 
its exhaustive determination by the self-representation of an a priori and a-contextual 
rational duty.  
 
 A second transformation occurs when Kant substitutes the idea of the maxim of a 
universally valid self-legislated law for Aquinas‘ fourfold normative system. In Kant, law 
must go through a reductio ad unum by reason, whereby both the laws of nature and 
human laws are analogized in their universality. This is why he offers the following as 
the formula of the perfect good will: ―act in accordance with maxims that can at the same 
time have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature.‖88   
 
The notion of autonomy as a good will that legislates for itself is the pinnacle of 
Kant‘s practical reason, for – ―autonomy is therefore the ground of the dignity of human 
nature and of every rational nature.‖89 Built on the ideas of perfect good will and of 
rationally necessary, aprioristic, and universal maxims as the sole determinant of this 
will, autonomy is at once the proof of and test for our humanity. Thus, the individual, 
equipped with a reason which bestows upon his will its own moral laws is, as both an 
instantiation and receptacle of the good, an end in itself.  From this special dignity 
necessarily follows, claims Kant, the duty to see all other comparable beings as 
potentially autonomous and, therefore, as ends in themselves,90 as inhabitants of an 
ideational kingdom of ends.91 Contemplated in their mutually reinforcing relation, a 
                                               
86 Ibid, 56, emphasis omitted.  
87 Ibid., 49, emphasis omitted.  
88 Ibid., 86, emphasis omitted. 
89 Ibid., 85, emphasis omitted.  
90 ―[E]very rational being, as an end in itself, must be able to regard himself as also giving universal laws 
with respect to any law whatsoever to which he may be subject: for, it is just this fitness of his maxims for 
giving universal law that marks him out as an end in itself; it also follows that this dignity (prerogative) he 
has over all merely natural beings brings with it that he must always take his maxims from the point of 
view of himself, and likewise every other rational being, as lawgiving beings (who for this reason are also 
called persons).‖ Ibid., 87.  
91 ―It is true that, even though a rational being scrupulously follows this maxim himself, he cannot for that 
reason count upon every other to be faithful to the same maxim nor can he count upon the kingdom of 
nature and its purposive order to harmonize with him, as a fitting member, toward a kingdom of ends 
possible through himself, that is, upon its favoring his expectation of happiness; nevertheless that law, act 
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priori normative reason and the legislative centrality of the self are considered to be 
sufficient elements for a conception of the inherent dignity of the person as an end in him 
or herself; an end who, as a full member of a kingdom of ends, can never be used solely 
as a means to achieve other ends.92  
  
 From the incommensurability of autonomy – ―in the kingdom of ends everything 
has either a price or a dignity. What […] is raised above all price and therefore admits of 
no equivalent has a dignity‖ – is derived the duty to unconditionally respect the inherent 
dignity of each person as such. This command is the third transformation Kant‘s model of 
practical reason contributes to the concept of cruelty. What in Montaigne was an 
empathizing concern for the pain of the other, in Kant is a rational command to respect 
the dignity embodied in each and every individual. In Kant, the sensibility articulated by 
Montaigne is pushed toward its reflective horizon in the form of a vision about what a 
form of collective life under conditions of critical morality would require from all its 
members, and to what it would entitle them; ―now, morality is the condition under which 
alone a rational being can be an end in itself, […] a lawgiving member in the kingdom of 
ends.‖93  
 
On a more general point, the idea of individuals possessing an inherent and 
unconditional dignity that commands universal and unconditional respect profoundly 
impacted modern moral, political, and legal reasoning. This idea is also the force behind 
the modern understanding of liberty as emancipation, where the negative concept of 
liberty as protection from undue interference is transformed into an affirmative concept 
of liberty as shaping individual and collective futures. It has furthermore, and it is no 
                                                                                                                                            
in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends, 
remains in its full force because it commands categorically. And just in this lies the paradox that the mere 
dignity of humanity as rational nature, without any other end or advantage to be attained by it – hence 
respect for a mere idea – is yet to serve as an inflexible precept of the will, and that it is just in this 
independence of maxims from all such incentives that their sublimity consists, and the worthiness of every 
rational subject to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends; for other wise he would have to be 
represented only as subject to the natural law of his needs.‖ Ibid., 87-88. 
92 Here is the archetypical formulation of this idea in the Kantian corpus: ―Rational nature is distinguished 
from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end. This end would be the matter of every good will. 
But since, in the idea of a will absolutely good without any limiting condition (attainment of this or that 
end) abstraction must be made altogether from every end to be effected (this would make every will only 
relatively good), the end must here be thought not as an end to be effected but as an independently existing 
end, and hence thought only negatively, that is, as that which must never be acted against and which must 
therefore in every volition be estimated never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end. 
Now, this end can be nothing other than the subject of all possible ends itself, because this subject is also 
the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for, such a will cannot without contradiction be subordinated 
to any other object.  The principle, so act with reference to every rational being (yourself and others) that in 
your maxim it holds at the same time as an end in itself, is thus at bottom the same as the basic principle, 
act on a maxim that at the same time contains in itself its own universal validity for every rational being. 
For, to say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim to the condition of its universal 
validity as a law for every subject is tantamount to saying that the subject of ends, that is, the rational being 
itself, must be made the basis of all maxims of actions, never merely as a means but as the supreme limiting 
condition in the use of all means, that is, always at the same time as an end.‖ Ibid., 86-87, emphasis 
omitted. 
93 Ibid., 84, emphasis omitted.     
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small feat, enabled criticism of courses of action, individual or collective predicaments, 
and states of affairs even when confronted with the complacency, acceptance or 
indifference of those subjected to them. In fact, to claim rights in the name of others has 
become the common practice not only in the courts of law, but in constitutional politics, 
social protest, and reform mobilizations everywhere. Had we not become able to 
articulate the normative basis for the claims we make on behalf of those incapable or 
unwilling to make them, modern law, society, and politics would be unrecognizable by 
us.      
 
 The normative vault under which we act and think, and beneath which our laws 
are created and enforced is shaped by the power of the idea of an inherent and 
unconditional dignity, the respect for which transcends instrumental interests, passions, 
and compassion. It has transformed and continues to transform modern criminal law, 
even as it struggles to grasp and live up to the demands and implications of human 
dignity. The idea of human dignity enhances the intellectual resources available to 
principled as well as to emotionalist rejections of cruelty. It however does not exhaust the 
cruelty-as-predicament model of practical reason. Human dignity needs to be 
complemented by sociological imagination and the insights into social structures and 
processes that come with it.94 
    
§ 
 
 The nineteenth-century brought social theory to the center of the humanities and 
social sciences. This intellectual discipline proclaimed the insufficiency, or even naïveté, 
of methodological individualism to explain widely observed phenomena. To supplement 
or rectify explanatory atomism, social theory appealed to social structures, systems, and 
processes as the forces that cause, directly or by acting behind the backs of individuals, 
social phenomena. Criminal law was not immune to focus on structures, systems and 
processes.    As the fourth group of quotes in the Introduction shows, courts have been 
aware of the structural causes and favoring conditions for cruelty, brutality, suffering, 
exploitation, disrespect for the dignity of the person, and vulnerability. However, how 
ideas of human dignity and social structures come together to forge a paradigm of 
practical reason about cruelty seems to have escaped the courts.  
 
 The first thing to understand about structural thinking is that structural causes or 
conditions can be positive or negative. Negative-structures function by restricting or 
filtering out opportunities for escaping cruelty and by maintaining in place conditions that 
favor cruelty. Positive-structures, on the other hand, set in place and motion causes and 
conditions of cruelty or otherwise forge the very forms of collective engagement in which 
cruelty thrives.  
 
Closely intertwined with negative-structure and positive-structure is the idea of 
vulnerability. The rejection of vulnerability has taken two expressions in thought. The 
                                               
94 C. Wright Mills defined sociological imagination as knowledge about the ways biography and history 
intersect. See his The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
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first rejects vulnerability as an intrinsic component of the human predicament and 
responds to this predicament with mental flight – ataraxia, tranquility and suspension of 
judgment in the ancient Pyrrhonic and Epicurean traditions – and practical evasion.  The 
second type of rejection of vulnerability embraces the risks of vulnerability that inhere in 
intellectual, moral, and practical engagement, concentrating on the imagination of 
strategies of individual and collective empowerment. It is in this second expression that a 
concern with vulnerability is best understood in the context of the third model of practical 
reason in the rejection of cruelty.   
 
Consider first the idea of negative-structure, in the articulation of which John 
Stuart Mill played an important role. As a good social theorist, Mill recognized the fact 
that modi vivendi ―form human character.‖95  Social theory has a conservative as well as a 
progressive branch. It is to the latter – in its commitment to ―social and political 
emancipation‖96 and the felt angst that accompanies the certainty that ―any society which 
is not improving, is deteriorating‖97 – that Mill belongs. The first insight of negative-
structure thinking predates Mill by millennia and, more proximately to him, was 
powerfully articulated by Rousseau. Mill‘s version of it is, however, made fully modern, 
placed as it was by Mill in the context of the modern rejection of social stasis and 
naturalized inequality. To stagnation and naturalization of social hierarchy Mill responds 
with hopes for individual bildung and social mobility under conditions of liberal politics 
and a capitalist economy. But above all, it is the realization that institutions never come 
to social life at a perfectly isonomic starting point for its members that makes this idea so 
important in criminal law. When they arrive in social life, the institutions of criminal 
justice operate to crystallize previous social arrangements and distributive patterns. Mill 
makes this point about laws in general, writing that:  
 
―Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognizing the relations they find 
already existing between individuals. They convert what was a mere physical fact 
into a legal right, give it the sanction of society, and principally aim at the 
substitution of public and organized means of asserting and protecting these 
rights, instead of the irregular and lawless conflict of physical strength. Those 
who had already been compelled to obedience became in this manner legally 
bound to it.‖98 
 
 In The Subjection of Women, Mill speaks of the subtle relationships between 
social structures and forms of consciousness. In their evolutionary dynamic, these 
relationships hide behind the opacity of the mechanisms of social cohesion and 
behavioral patterns. Speaking of the predicament of women, Mill points to the way their 
embedding social structures negatively influence their opportunities to escape suffering, 
rendering them, on the contrary, more vulnerable to cruelty and exploitation. As he 
                                               
95 John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays,  ed. John 
Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 494. 
96Ibid., 568. 
97 Ibid., 574. 
98 Ibid, 745. 
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unequivocally states the problem, ―sex is to all women […] a peremptory exclusion.‖ A 
form of exclusion that, because of the largely stealthy negative operation of its structural 
components, remains widely unseen. Invisible, its victims are thus condemned to ―the 
feeling of a wasted life‖ 99 and suffering without sympathy from the rest of society.  
 
 Mill‘s probing analysis played a major role in the form of criticism of the status 
quo that characterized the nineteenth-century.  He speaks of the ―cruel experience‖ of 
those who historically tried to oppose the mechanisms of human unhappiness; and of how 
their insubordination was met with the force of law and the whole apparatus of social 
norms and entrenched prejudices. To make things worse, the rebels appeared ―in the eyes 
of those whom they resisted, […] not only guilty of crime, but the worst of all crimes, 
deserving the most cruel chastisement which human beings could inflict.‖100 According 
to Mill, the legal and customary apparatuses of negative-structures are reinforced by the 
combination of impossibility of collective action caused by the dispersion of its victims 
and the proximity to which they are kept to the micro-agents – in the case of patriarchal 
societies, their fathers and husbands; in the case of the criminal justice system, sentencing 
judges and prison wards among others – of negative-structures. This situation, in Mill‘s 
eyes and Foucault‘s language, exemplifies the deployment of capillary power, where, ―in 
the case of women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of bribery and 
intimidation combined.‖101 
 
 With the practical and institutional mechanisms of negative-structure – foremost 
among which is, in the case of the subjection of women, marriage as ―domestic 
slavery‖102 –comes its ideological component, by the influence of which, Mill asks, ―was 
there ever any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it?‖103 A 
question which already speaks to the ―fanaticism with which men cling to the theories 
that justify their passions and legitimate their personal interest,‖104 Mill‘s critique of 
negative-structure is indeed carved from the same block as much of its twentieth-century 
counterparts in critical theory and existential feminism: ―in the present day, power holds 
a smoother language, and whomsoever it oppresses, always pretends to do so for their 
own good.‖105  
 
 Against negative-structures‘ instruments of social and cultural order – 
―institutions, books, education, society, all go on training human beings for the old, long 
after the new has come‖ – Mill prescribes reform on the shoulders of reflection.106 Born 
to live as equals, according to Mill, individuals require a type of society in which the 
                                               
99 Ibid, 581-582, for both quotes.  
100 Ibid, 478. 
101 Ibid, 482. 
102 Ibid, 507. 
103 Ibid, 482.   
104 Ibid., 483. 
105 Ibid., 524-525. 
106 ―It is one of the characteristic prejudices of the reaction of the nineteenth-century against the eighteenth, 
to accord to the unreasoning elements in human nature the infallibility which the eighteenth-century is 
supposed to have ascribed to the reasoning elements.‖ Mill, The Subjection of Women, 473-474. 
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virtue of equality can be learned and practiced. It is exactly this greenhouse for the 
flourishing of human virtues that spurious negative-structures fail to provide. For 
example, the family under conditions of the subjection of women is, for Mill, a training 
camp of despotism.107 
 
 Under the reflective push of social theory, the uniquely modern concern with 
human predicament is incorporated into moral and legal thought. This is the concern of 
an era in which ―human beings are no longer […] chained down by an inexorable bond to 
the place they are born to, but are free to employ their faculties […] to achieve the lot 
which may appear to them most desirable.‖  The combined mission of reflection, freedom 
of thought, and institutions based on equality and liberty is to fight off spurious negative-
structures.108 Mill calls, therefore, for an intensified awareness about the surviving 
remains in modern times of pre-modern negative-structures, lest society continues to 
recreate the fertile soil in which cruelty and vulnerability thrive.  The applicability of 
negative-structure thinking to the problem of cruelty in criminal law should be obvious.  
 
§ 
 
 The fundamental insight on the problem of positive-structures is that the diffuse 
agency of macro arrangements can actively and directly cause cruelty. Karl Marx is an 
important thinker in this regard, as he seeks to causally explain the cruelty of humiliation, 
exploitation, and existential oblivion as by-products of social structures. With him, 
concern with positive-structures is transformed in one of the causes célèbres and 
canonical themes of modern thought.109 Another protagonist of the nineteenth-century 
tradition of social inquiry, Marx‘s particular contributions to the philosophical analysis of 
positive-structures lays on the role of impersonal,110 often inescapable and stealthy causal 
complexes, set in place and urged forward by these structures. Inspiring Marx‘s relentless 
criticism is a little noticed Kantian-style critique of the instrumentalization of individuals 
and of dehumanizing social practices.  
 
Appreciation of Marx‘s contribution is enhanced by contextualization of his 
critique of positive-structures within his broader philosophy of praxis. From his earlier 
works through Das Capital, Marx advances a conception of productive practice – labor111 
                                               
107 Ibid., 580.  
108 Ibid., 488. 
109 The causal force of positive-structure figured prominently, if yet in a rustic and under-developed form, 
as early as in Plato‘s work, as the initial exchanges in Laws illustrate. In this tradition, see also Jean-Jacque 
Rousseau‘s Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men and Discourse on the 
Sciences and Arts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).   
110 ―I do not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colours. But individuals are dealt 
with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers of particular 
class-relations and interests. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of 
society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for 
relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself 
above them.‖ Ibid., 92 (Preface). 
111 Hannah Arendt rightly distinguishes between labor, work, and action.  Much of what Marx refers to as 
labor would correspond to work, the activity of creation of objects with some independent permanency, in 
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– the essential human element of which is in the prior ideational representation of its 
object – the product of labor – whereby in the product of labor ―man not only effects a 
change of form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purposes in those 
materials.‖112 Hence, as an alter ego of the self, the product of labor gives an outward 
dimension to the otherwise esoteric contents of the consciousness. For Marx, it is the 
cumulative and collective process of interposing the product of labor as a buffer between 
the daily and ordinary human life, on the one hand, and immaculate nature, on the other, 
that humanizes the species and creates a social, human world. Labor is, in this picture, a 
necessary constitutive element to the very predicament of social life; it is, in Marx‘s 
words, ―an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and 
nature, and therefore human life itself.‖113 Labor, by definition, does not occur in a social 
vacuum. Its forms are, argues Marx, predicated upon preexisting macro social structures 
and their evolution over time. The historical organization of labor has a direct and 
profound impact on the very humanization of the species and the existential fortuna of 
each individual self. What, then, if certain historical forms of labor are inherently cruel in 
that they engender social processes of exploitation, misery, existential oblivion, and 
inauthenticity, and humiliation? If laboring inheres in the human condition, what to say 
of the stakes in a form of cruelty that is parasitic to it? When that is the case, the agency 
of cruelty comes from positive-structures rather than discreet and personal agency.  
 
Structural cruelty, though impersonal in its agency and diffuse in its victimization, 
has nonetheless both a historical and a moral element, the combination of which opens up 
a new normative horizon. In the specific case of labor in early capitalism, rather than 
channeling the humanizing, outward surfeiting of the self into tangible tokens of creative 
freedom, labor enslaves, and ―just as man is governed, in religion, by the products of his 
own brain, so, in capitalist production, he is governed by the products of his own 
hand.‖114 
 
For Marx, capitalism consists of the dynamic and synergetic interplay between 
negative- and positive-structures. He shares with Mill the understanding that legal 
frameworks tend to crystallize preexisting regimes of power allocation and distributive 
schemes already prevailing on the ground. In the case of capitalism, the laborer, pressed 
by the ―cruel nature-imposed necessity that his capacity for labour has required for its 
production a definite quantity of the means of subsistence,‖115 is forced to surrender his 
existential potentials to a life marked by extortion under the legitimizing cover of an 
                                                                                                                                            
Arendt‘s conceptual framework. See her The Human Condition (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), Chapters III, IV, and V. 
112 Adding that ―this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity 
of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. This subordination is no mere momentary act. Apart from 
the exertion of the working organs, a purposeful will is required for the entire duration of the work. This 
means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work and the way in which it has to be 
accomplished, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as the free play of his own physical and mental powers, 
the closer his attention is forced to be.‖  Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I. (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977), 283-284. 
113 Ibid., 133. 
114 Ibid., 771-772. 
115 Ibid., 277. 
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appearance of justice and individual and political rights enforcement, that is in the ―very 
Eden of the innate rights of man[…], the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property 
and Bentham.‖ But when we leave this sphere where the ―free-trader vulgaris‖ performs 
the ventriloquism of rights, justice, and efficiency, the cruel and hitherto veiled reality of 
the structural conditions of laboring reveals the laborer, Marx indicts, as ―someone who 
has brought his own hide to market […] now has nothing else to expect but – a 
tanning.‖116 
 
 The institutions of capitalism as a comprehensive positive-structure operate, 
according to Marx, with an iron law that commands the misery of the waged laboring 
classes; a misery which corresponds to the substitution of ―capitalist exploitation‖ for 
―feudal exploitation.‖117 Criticizing the political economists of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries for their idyllicization of the passage from feudal bondage to free 
labor under capitalism, Marx reminds his readers that the modus operandi of primitive 
capital accumulation, with their massive populational dislocation and immiseration, are 
hardly idyllic.118 While the feudal structure of rural or guild-based labor kept laborers in 
abject personal bondage and subjection, it also afforded them some sort of de facto limits 
to exploitation and cruelty. With capitalism, the ties of bondage and subjection are 
broken and laborers are thrown into the market as free economic agents. However, this 
freedom is bought, says Marx, at a dear price: ―robbed of all their own means of 
production, and all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal 
arrangements,‖119 the newly freed laborers were condemned to sell their only remaining 
possession – themselves. The history behind this type of modern vulnerability is that of 
exploitation based, first, on the expropriation of the means of production and, in the 
sequence, on the laborer‘s alienation from the very products their work and from fellow 
human beings. This history, accuses Marx, ―is written in the annals of mankind in letters 
of blood and fire.‖120 In fact, explained Marx, capitalism as a positive-structure forces the 
individuals to live a ―double life‖ as the abstract moral persona of the citizen in its 
entitlement to equality and commitments to the public good and, simultaneously, as the 
egoistic member of the civil society, acting as a private rent-seeker using (to repeat 
Kantian language) ―other people as means.‖121 
                                               
116 Ibib., 279-280, emphases omitted.  
117 Ibid., 875. 
118 Ibid., 87. Also, on the same page, ―in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, 
robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part. In the tender annals of political economy, the idyllic 
reigns from time immemorial.‖ 
119 Ibid., 875. 
120 Ibid., 875. 
121 Ibid., 36.  The entire passage, with emphases omitted, reads: ―Where the political state has attained its 
true development, man leads – and not only in thought, in consciousness, but also in reality, in life – a 
double life, a heavenly one and an earthly one, a life in the political community, in which he counts as 
communal being, and a life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, views other people as 
means, debases himself to the status of a means, and becomes the plaything of alien forces. The political 
state relates just as spiritually to civil society as heaven does to earth. It stands in the same opposition, and 
overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the limitedness of the secular world, i.e., by 
recognizing, restoring, and allowing itself to be governed by civil society. Man in his immediate reality, in 
civil society, is a secular being. Here, where he counts for himself and others as a real individual, he is a 
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 Confronted, on one side, by the new forms of suffering engendered by modern 
positive-structures and, on the other, by the way in which dominant forms of legal and 
economic theory disregarded and veiled the cruelty inherent in the new human condition, 
Marx articulated an agenda of ―human emancipation.‖122 This agenda inspired his project 
of a social order organized upon a normative view of human entitlements, and, in no 
uncertain Kantian spirit, constantly under the inspection of deep-cutting social criticism. 
Armed with this criticism, Marx offers a constructive stance on emancipation which aims 
at overcoming the vulnerabilities spurious positive-structures engender. Human 
emancipation takes on a concrete dimension around human praxis and the institutions 
within which they take. This, in turn, leads to a material view of the requirements of 
emancipation. 
  
 Marx‘s materialist analysis has nonetheless an important ideational component. 
Because the general conditions of human praxis engender, in Marx‘s as well as in Mill‘s 
views, an overgrowth of reinforcing institutional and ideational apparatuses, critique of 
positive-structure should, if it aspires at being effective, target also the ideational 
mechanisms of rationalization, legitimation, and veiling. Reason is urged, in the Socratic 
fashion, to turn over itself in order to break free from its self-imposed fetters. However, 
and here is a conundrum always haunting reflective hopes, how is reason supposed to 
remove its blindfold if  ―it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, 
but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.‖123  
 
 Marx‘s answer to this conundrum is, as hinted at above, an ethos. An ethos and 
corresponding posture that tries to carve in human existence a balcony from which things 
become visible as they really are, in their intricate mechanisms and suffering-causing 
capabilities. This critical posture should, he recommends, ―start out by taking any form of 
theoretical and practical consciousness and develop from the unique forms of existing 
reality the true reality as its norm and final goal.‖124 It should turn itself into a ―ruthless 
criticism of everything existing.‖ Unforgiving criticism as a life posture ―must not be 
afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be.‖ However, once it 
manages to climb all the way up to that balcony, enlightened consciousness is not 
                                                                                                                                            
false semblance. In the state, on the other hand, where man counts as a species-being, he is an imaginary 
member of an illusory sovereignty, is robbed of his actual individual life, and is filled with an unreal 
universality.‖ And Marx proceeds to add that ―Political democracy is Christian in that in it man […] has 
value as a sovereign being, the highest being, but this is man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, man in his 
accidental existence, man just as he is, corrupted by the entire organization of our society, lost to himself, 
alienated, under the domination of inhuman relationships and elements – in a word, man who is not yet an 
actual species-being. The fantasy, the dream, the postulate of Christianity, namely the sovereignty of man – 
but man as an alien being, different from actual man – is in democracy a sensuous reality, presence, secular 
maxim.‖ Ibid, 41, emphases omitted. 
122 ―After history has long enough been reduced to superstition, we are going to reduce superstition to 
history. The question of the relationship of political emancipation to religion becomes for us the question of 
the relationship of political emancipation to human emancipation.‖ Marx, ―On the Jewish Question,‖ 33-34, 
emphases omitted.  
123 Marx, Capital, 4 (Preface).  
124 Marx, ―For a Ruthless Criticism,‖ 14.  
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supposed to indulge itself in banal exercises of idealistic blue-printing.125 The proper 
tasks appointed by Marx for the unfettered and awakened reflective conscience is both 
profoundly modern and philosophically archaic in its callings. He writes:  
 
The reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to clarify 
its consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself, in explaining to 
it the meaning of its own actions. […] Our motto must therefore be: 
Reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but through analyzing the 
mystical consciousness, the consciousness which is unclear to itself […]. 
Then it will transpire that the world has long been dreaming of something 
that it can acquire if only it becomes conscious of it. It will transpire that it 
is not a matter of drawing a great dividing line between past and future, 
but of carrying out the thoughts of the past. And finally, it will transpire 
that mankind begins no new work, but consciously accomplishes its old 
work. […] It is a matter of confession, no more. To have its sins forgiven 
mankind has only to declare them to be what they really are.126  
 
 With the critique of positive-structures, the conception of cruelty in criminal law 
is inoculated with another agent-independent component. Only those prepared to pay a 
significant intellectual price can indulge in oblivion of the pervasive impersonal social 
mechanisms of exclusion, exploitation, immiseration, and humiliation. When we think 
about the development of clusters of normative arguments tenable under conditions of 
reflectivity, the critique of positive-structures stands out as an integral part of novel 
model of practical reason in law. In this model, sociological imagination – in the sense of 
critical awareness about the nature and operation of social structures and processes as 
they detrimentally impact individuals and groups – in the service of emancipation 
substitutes for an objective normative system supposedly able to tell virtue from vice. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
The fourth conception of cruelty adjusts the definitional focus to human dignity as 
the highest value and to accommodate positive and negative structural conditions of 
cruelty. This significantly enhances the capacity of the conception of cruelty to capture 
cruel predicaments that the former conceptions left out of their conceptual net. 
Furthermore, the argumentative structure of the fourth conception of cruelty and the 
model of practical reason that gives it meaning and traction is capacious enough to 
subsume under it agent and victim-based conceptions. Under this latter conception, 
violations of human dignity that in normal circumstances reach the suffering threshold for 
cruelty constitute a sufficient criterion for a finding of cruelty. And that is the case even if 
the victim is unaware or unconscious and there is no individualized agency causally 
                                               
125 Ibid., 13, for all preceding quotes, with emphases omitted.  
126 Ibid., 15, emphases omitted.      
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responsible. By necessity, cruelty also obtains when discreet agency and actual suffering 
are the case. 
 
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The agent-objective conception of cruelty stipulates behavioral deviation from 
specific objective norms as the definitional element of cruelty. The agent-subjective 
conception demands, in addition, the presence of a specific type of mens rea before 
cruelty can be found. Both conceptions share emphasis on agency as the ultimate 
definitional element of cruelty. In contrast, the victim-subjective conception foregrounds 
suffering as the central element of cruelty, and is prepared to find it even in 
circumstances where questions about behavioral deviation and mens rea cannot be 
satisfied. The victim-objective/agent-independent definition of cruelty dispenses with 
the requirements of insulated agency and sentient victimhood. This fourth conception 
extrapolates from and yet incorporates the previous ones. In this fourth conception, 
cruelty occurs even in the absence of conscious physical or psychological suffering or is 
structurally and impersonally caused.  
 
The fourth conception of cruelty departs fundamentally from the understandings 
of agency, victimization, and causality found in the others. Indeed, the fourth conception 
foregrounds the value of unconditional and inherent human dignity and is preoccupied 
with the positive and negative structural conditions of justice in criminal law. Unlike 
previous conceptions of cruelty, the fourth requires a model of practical reasoning that 
embraces the critique of thought and society as its leading task, and demands that 
significant coerced vulnerability and cruelty be rejected. This last model has been a 
fundamental force in the evolution of criminal law.   
 
 
§ 
 
 
Philosophical analyses of concepts such as cruelty are often helpful in 
understanding the normative viewpoints influencing social developments more generally. 
As a medium between the mind and the outside world, normative concepts function as 
evaluative as well as cognitive lenses.127 As cognitive lenses, concepts can conceal, 
                                               
127 Skinner offers an eloquent example of the cognitive and normative nature of concepts based on the well-
known phenomenon of the requirements of social legitimation of the agency of the commercial classes in 
Elizabethan England: ―The merchant cannot hope to describe any action he may choose to perform as being 
‗religious‘ in character, but only those which can be claimed with some show of plausibility to meet such 
agreed criteria as there may be for the application of the term. It follows that if he is anxious to have his 
conduct appraised as that of a genuinely religious man, he will find himself restricted to the performance of 
only a certain range of actions. Thus the problem facing the merchant who wishes to be seen as pious rather 
than self-interested cannot simply be the instrumental one of tailoring his account of his principles in order 
to fit his projects; it must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects in order to make them answer to 
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distort, or reveal parts of the world. As evaluative lenses – and as potential vessels of 
normative reflectivity – concepts can be used to criticize, justify, or point in directions 
that transform whole segments of society and culture. During the time of its cultural 
tenure, the same concept can, moreover, sometimes veil and at other times unveil, 
sometimes criticize and at other times legitimize the same or similar phenomena it is 
supposed to semantically cover.128 That is why writing biographies of concepts129 is a 
particularly fruitful way of discovering, from time to time, what counts as reality and 
what people think of it.    
 
The biography of concepts and ideas may also raise awareness about the 
contingent and potentially fragile nature of what often achieves the ontological status of 
undisputed reality or the normative status of a good independence from transitory minds 
and historical contexts. In the particular case of normative ideas and concepts, their 
cultural fate is doomed to be an endless drama of dogma and trivialization, except when 
                                                                                                                                            
the pre-existing language of moral principles.‖ He then concludes: ―The story of the merchant suggests two 
morals. One is that it must be a mistake to portray the relationship between our social vocabulary and our 
social world as a purely external and contingent one. It is true that our social practices help to bestow 
meaning on our social vocabulary. But it is equally true that our social vocabulary helps to constitute the 
character of those practices. To see the role of our evaluative language in helping to legitimate social action 
is to see the point at which our social vocabulary and our social fabric mutually prop each other up. [...] 
The other moral is that, if there are indeed causal linkages between social language and social reality, to 
speak of the one as mirroring the other may be to envisage the causal arrows pointing in the wrong 
direction. As the example of the Elizabethan merchant suggests, to recover the nature of the normative 
vocabulary available to an agent for the description and appraisal of his conduct is at the same time to 
indicate one of the constraints on his conduct itself. This in turn suggests that, if we wish to explain why 
our merchant chose to concentrate on certain courses of action while avoiding others, we are bound to 
make some reference to the prevailing moral language of the society in which he was acting. For this, it 
now appears, must have figured not as an epiphenomenon of his projects, but as one of the determinants of 
his actions.‖  Quentin Skinner, ―Language and Political Change‖ in Political Innovation and Conceptual 
Change, ed. Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 21-22. With insight forged under the ―cruel iron‖ of slavery, Frederick Douglass, when speaking of 
the particular condition of slavery in Maryland, positioned as it was at the borders of freedom and the 
public opinion there bred, rightly affirmed that ―Public opinion is, indeed, an unfailing restraint upon the 
cruelty and barbarity of masters, overseers, and slave- drivers, whenever and wherever it can reach them; 
but there are certain secluded and out-of-the-way places, even in the state of Maryland, seldom visited by a 
single ray of healthy public sentiment-- where slavery, wrapt in its own congenial, midnight darkness, –
can–, and –does–, develop all its malign and shocking characteristics; where it can be indecent without 
shame, cruel without shuddering, and murderous without apprehension or fear of exposure. […]  Public 
opinion in such a quarter, the reader will see, is not likely to be very efficient in protecting the slave from 
cruelty. On the contrary, it must increase and intensify his wrongs. Public opinion seldom differs very 
widely from public practice. To be a restraint upon cruelty and vice, public opinion must emanate from a 
humane and virtuous community.‖  Ibid., 47-49. 
128 Cruelty is, of course, an ―essentially contested concept‖ as its semantic frontiers are permanently in 
disputation in the various contexts in which a claim of cruelty is presented. The locus classical for the 
analyses of the nature of essentially contestable concepts is W.B. Gallie, ―Essentially Contested Concepts,‖ 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56, no. 167 (1956): 167-178. 
129 A case in point is Daniel Baraz‘s sound intellectual history of the concept of cruelty in his Medieval 
Cruelty: Changing Perceptions, Late Antiquity to the Early Modern Period (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2003). An earlier article by Baraz – ―Seneca, Ethics, and the Body: The Treatment of Cruelty in 
Medieval Thought,‖ Journal of the History of Ideas 59,no. 2 (1998): 195-215 – had already been helpful at 
a very early stage of the reflections culminating in this work. 
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they come to live under conditions of exacting reflectivity. When, and as long as, this is 
the case, their lives are marked by continuous reflective progress, if slow and under 
constant threat of temporary regress at every turn of events.  How exacting reflectivity 
can be made in a large part a function of the broader models of practical reason within 
which social agents must argue and act.  
 
The importance of reflectivity and practical reason goes a long way to explain the 
appeal and cogency of the victim-objective/agent-independent concept of cruelty and the 
model of practical reason committed to inherent and unconditional dignity and open to a 
more nuanced and complex notion of causation in human affairs. I argue that precisely 
because of its reflective strength, cruelty-as-predicament has carved, and continues to 
carve, leagues and leagues of the normative horizon before which criminal law evolves.  
 
How then, we ask, accounts of the development of modern criminal law fail to 
consider the emergence and transformation of conceptions of cruelty? Law is not the 
normatively deaf product of social programing on the basis of instrumental and intra-
systemic rationality, memetic forms of collective consciousness, brute power, political 
strategizing, or transitory public opinion. These are only as important as incomplete 
factors can be. Because the riddle of the development of modern criminal law is partially 
coextensive to the evolution of conceptions of cruelty and the models of practical reason 
that accompany them, we can now expect to be able to better solve it.  
 
The key to the resolution of the interpretive-explanatory challenge of accounting 
for  the evolution of criminal law passes, I suggested throughout, through the 
understanding of the independent causal force of the internal push toward ever greater 
reflectivity operating from within normative vistas subject to increasingly more pressing 
demands of rationality and justification. The sort of reflectivity which, as a virus, can be 
inoculated into normative argumentative structures and from within – as Socrates tried to 
teach Thrasimachus130 – push their development in discernible directions. The 
development of the ideas about cruelty illustrates the point, for if we start from an agent-
based conception of cruelty, under conditions of reflectivity, and with the other causal 
factors obtaining, at some point down the road of legal reflectivity the tendency would be 
to arrive at a victim-objective/agent-independent conception. 
 
The implications for the jurisprudence of criminal law of the causal role of 
reflectivity are twofold. First, because reflectivity is a fundamental component of any 
causal explanation of the development of modern criminal justice systems, jurisprudential 
exercises that fail to take an evolutionary perspective oriented toward increasing 
reflectivity are stillborn. Second, because rationally justifiable ideals are deeply 
connected with the push of reflectivity, the hopes for a cruelty-free system of punishment 
                                               
130 See Plato‘s Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999-2000) and the reading of the 
Thrasymachus‘ exchange by Hanna Pitkin in Chapter VIII of her Wittgenstein and Justice: On the 
Significance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1972). 
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are over time silenced if criminal law theory fails to articulate the normative, 
institutional, and practical requirements of a cruelty-free criminal justice system.  
 
Reflectivity has many allies, but at least as many enemies. Following the example 
of the Greeks, Montesquieu used to prescribe music as a preventive therapy against 
cruelty,131 for it humanizes the soul and softens the temper.132 The liberal legal tradition 
of Judith Shklar and Richard Rorty advises that we nurture and combine softness of 
sensibility with firmness of character in a way capable of inspiring an ever-enlarging 
sphere of cruelty-disgusted empathy. Opposing this sort of moral sensibility, the tradition 
of Callicles133 and Nietzsche134 confronts us with the accusation of appeasing to ―slave 
morality,‖ a morality forever hostage to petty and resentful existences. Nevertheless, the 
reflective rejection of cruelty suggests a model of practical reason in criminal law that 
differs from both traditions. The force behind a model of practical reason such as cruelty-
as-predicament is not a softened sensibility entailing an enlarged empathy, although we 
should certainly settle for that if hope for more had to be forfeited. The strength of 
cruelty-as-predicament lies in its greater reflectivity and the greater conceptual scope of 
the victim-objective/agent-independent understanding of cruelty it makes justifiable.    
 
 
                                               
131 See Book IV (viii.i) of his The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
132 This is directly contested by Adam Smith, who saw more of these virtues – themselves so desired in 
commercial societies – among the Romans than the Greeks. See his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund: 1981), pages 774-775. 
133 The dramatis personae in Plato‘s Gorgias. 
134 On The Genealogy of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
